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Abstract
The existence of strong cryptoalgorithms is not sufficient to guarantee the 
security and/or authentication required in a system. To obtain an assurance 
for the security and/or authentication required, the underlying cryptoalgo­
rithm must be used within a set of rules or procedures known as a protocol. 
Even if the cryptoalgorithm were secure, it is possible to subvert the proto­
col. There are numerous instances of failures in protocols employing public 
key and private key cryptoalgorithms. Several systems exist for analysis of 
protocols, to find such failures in them. These systems use formal analysis 
methods based on a model of communicating state machines or modal logics 
of belief like BAN and GNY. Besides, it is difficult to understand the working 
of protocols by looking at the description of messages in them.
This thesis proposes a graphical user interface based tool for aiding in the 
design and analysis of cryptographic protocols. It provides a feature to display 
the working of protocols in the form of a schematic diagram, as an educational 
tool for understanding protocols. Secondly, it provides an interface to an 
existing program for performing automated GNY logic analysis. The tool, 
we propose also provides facilities for single stepping through protocols whilst 
viewing the beliefs attained by the principals, viewing of proofs derived from 
the GNY tool, and a feature for run-time modification of initial assumptions. 
It has been used to perform analysis of well known protocols and the expected 
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The aim of this thesis is to describe the development of a graphical user in­
terface (GUI) based tool to assist in the design and analysis of cryptographic 
protocols. The use of this tool is basically two-fold; to serve as an educational 
tool for understanding of cryptographic protocols and to provide a user friendly 
graphical user interface to perform analysis of protocols using the GNY logic, 
proposed by Gong, Needham and Yahalom.
1.2 Scope
The tool can be used to demonstrate the working of cryptographic proto­
cols and helps with their security analysis. Cryptographic protocols [4, 7] are 
usually illustrated by showing principals as nodes and messages transmitted 
between them as arrows from the senders to the receivers accompanied by the 
text of the actual transmitted message. The tool presents protocols diagram­
matically in this manner.
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In GNY logic analysis, the idealized form of a protocol together with the 
initial assumptions of the principals are used to calculate a set of beliefs for 
each principal. By observing the set of beliefs, it can be inferred whether the 
protocol has achieved its goal or not.
The Protocol Analyzer provides aid in GNY logic analysis of protocols. It 
displays a given protocol in graphical form: the principals are shown as circular 
nodes and arrows between them represent potential communication channels 
between them. For each message in the protocol the link between the sender 
and the receiver is highlighted with an arrow, showing the direction, and the 
message content is displayed.
Given the concrete description of a protocol and a set of initial assumptions, 
the Protocol Analyzer performs GNY logic analysis as it steps through the 
protocol.
It displays the beliefs set of each principal separately at every stage in 
the protocol and provides a facility to modify the initial assumptions of the 
protocol and rerun the protocol. Thus one can observe the evolution of beliefs 
for each principal and also infer about the initial assumptions which are critical 
to the protocol achieving its goal at the end.
To implement the above features, the tool relies on previous work which is 
described in the next section.
1.3 Previous Work
The Protocol Analyzer proposed in this thesis relies on an existing tool for 
GNY logic analysis of protocols [12, 13, 29].
A basic tool for performing belief based BAN logic analysis of protocols is 
described in [12]. This is a tool written in XSB Prolog which accepts the input
10
specification of a protocol in BAN logic, along with the initial assumptions of 
all principals, and derives the beliefs attained by all principals due to the run 
of the protocol.
The tool is subsequently enhanced to perform GNY logic analysis of pro­
tocols [13, 31]. The enhanced version accepts the protocol specification and 
initial assumptions and derives the beliefs held by the principals, using GNY 
logic postulates.
The GNY logic tool just described is not a user friendly tool and expects 
the protocol messages to be in idealized form. Hence a manual transformation 
from the concrete form to the idealized form has to be performed . Besides, 
there is no way to look at beliefs of each principal at the end of each step, 
as all the beliefs obtained as a result of a step, or steps, are output by the 
tool, collectively. Also the beliefs are output in idealized form without any 
modifications, making them difficult to understand.
1.4 The Protocol Analyzer
The Protocol Analyzer described in this thesis, uses the GNY tool mentioned 
above, and provides a user friendly interface to it so as to overcome some of 
the limitations mentioned above.
The Protocol Analyzer takes the concrete description of a protocol and 
provides a translator for this language to the idealized form required by the 
GNY tool. It communicates with the GNY tool, obtains beliefs held by prin­
cipals and displays them. Additionally it displays the user chosen protocol in 
graphical form.
11
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1.5 Outline of the thesis
The thesis is organized as follows:
1. Chapter 2 describes security analysis of cryptographic protocols and il­
lustrates typical failures in them.
2. Chapter 3 describes formal analysis of cryptographic protocols and specif­
ically two belief based logics BAN and GNY.
3. Chapter 4 describes automation of protocol analysis and gives compar­
ison of an existing GUI based protocol analysis tool, The Interrogator, 
and the automated GNY logic tool, described in the thesis.
4. Chapter 5 describes an overview of the features and design of the pro­
posed Protocol Analyzer.
5. Chapter 6 includes details of results obtained by using the tool for anal­
yses of Voting and Otway-Rees protocols.
6. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by proposing possible extensions to the 
Protocol Analyzer.
Appendix A lists the source files for the entire program and Appendix B 






The basic goals of cryptography are to provide secrecy and authentication in a 
system. To achieve these objectives, cryptographers have developed complex 
cryptoalgorithms. These algorithms are designed to be resistant to attacks by 
intruders with access to powerful computers.
However the mere existence of strong cryptoalgorithms is not sufficient 
to guarantee the required security and/or authentication in the system. The 
cryptoalgorithm must be used within a set of rules or procedures known as 
a protocol, to provide the security and authentication required. In a system 
which employs a protocol, if the underlying cryptoalgorithm were broken then 
the intended function of the protocol could be subverted. On the other hand 
it is feasible to subvert a protocol without impeaching or even eroding the 
security of the underlying cryptoalgorithm.
There are instances of subversion of key distribution protocols, to distribute 
keys to unintended recipients, secrecy protocols, to publicly reveal contents of 
secret information, and digital signature protocols to make forgery possible
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and yet all these are based on cryptoalgorithms that are considered secure. In 
the case of a protocol which uses Vernam encryption/decryption when used 
with a properly chosen one-time key is well known to be unconditionally secure
[16] and still the protocol fails totally. This type of dramatic failure is known 
as a protocol failure.
In the case of many protocols, the security of the cryptographic portion 
is weakened by factors like reducing the size of the key space. Though such 
cases are potential sources of failure in the security functions of protocols, 
they are not the only sources of protocol failures. In the rest of this chapter, a 
range of protocol failures are considered and the reasons for such failures and 
conclusions that are derivable from them for protocol analysis and design are 
discussed.
2.2 Protocol Failures
2.2.1 TM N Protocol Failure
The first example considered is of a key distribution protocol whose goal is to 
provide a pair of principals, on an open communications channel, with a com­
mon cryptographic session key which is to be kept secret from eavesdroppers 
and other subscribers. This example is chosen because it illustrates how the 
protocol can fail by allowing an intruder to recover the session key in real-time, 
in spite of the protocol being based on one unconditionally secure [16] and one 
provably secure [16] cryptoalgorithm.
The protocol is that proposed by Tatebayashi, Matsuzaki and Newman
[17]. The setting of the protocol is as follows.
It is assumed that all user terminals have the capability to carry out one 
of a complementary pair of public-key operations. An example is forming a
14
modular cube with respect to a composite modulus and the complementary 
operation being, taking a modular cube root. Another capability the terminals 
have is to carry out a simple symmetric key encryption (for example imple­
menting unconditionally secure Vernam ciphers by forming the exclusive-OR 
of a binary one time key with binary text).
The protocol works as follows. A subscriber A wishing to communicate 
securely with subscriber B sends a randomly chosen one-time key encrypted 
under its end of the server’s public key system with a request to set up a secure 
channel with B. The server requests B to generate a random session key. B does 
this and also encrypts it under the other end of the server’s public key system 
and sends this cipher to the server. The server can perform the hard task of 
decrypting ciphers in the public-key system and decrypts these two ciphers to 
recover the session key generated by B and the one-time key generated by A. 
Ten, the server performs Vernam encryption of the session key and the one-time 
key by forming the exclusive-OR of their binary representations and sends the 
resulting cipher to A. A can then decrypt this cipher using the initially chosen 
one-time key, to obtain the session key. A and B now have a common key 
which they can use to communicate securely. The goal of the protocol seems 
to have been achieved. Terminals with very limited computational capability 
can exchange keys using two secure cryptoalgorithms - Vernam encryption 
with an appropriately generated one-time key which is unconditionally secure 
and extracting modular cube roots with properly chosen prime factors in the 
modulus which is provably secure [16]. In spite of this, the TMN protocol 
exhibits a simple failure.
The Failure
Let it be assumed that another subscriber C has eavesdropped on the three 
ciphers - the session key and the one-time key each encrypted using the server’s
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public key and the Vernam encryption of the session key with the one-time key 
in the setting up of a secure channel between A and B. C has an arrangement 
with another subscriber D such that D will return a session key when requested 
by the server, which is known to C. Even if D chooses the key randomly, C 
will know what key to expect.
When C sees the cipher r\ mod n pass from B to the server, C chooses a 
random number rc  and forms a cipher
rc ( rB m°d n) mod n
and sends it to the server with a request to the server for a secure channel 
with D. In the meantime C precomputes r^1, for later use. The server then 
requests D to supply a session key, which is r, is known to both C and D and 
this is undetectable to the server. The server takes the cube root of the above 
cipher to obtain rcrB and forms the cipher
r © rc rB
believing it to be the encryption of the session key supplied by D with C ’s 
one-time key and sends it to C. Knowing r, C can calculate rcrB as:
rc rB =  r 0  (r 0  rc rB)
Using the previously computed r^1, rB can be recovered as:
rB =  r c l {rc rB) =  (r^1(r 0  (r 0  rc rB)))
Using rB, C can now eavesdrop on all communication between A and B; 
without being detected. All this has happened in the time required to set up 
a channel on the net, undetected by the server.
The reason for this failure in the TMN protocol is basically because the 
session keys and one-time keys sent by the users to the server are assumed to be
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random. The keys are to be chosen from some known or specified set or range 
according to a known probability distribution. Depending upon the type of 
protocol, this assumption may be verifiable and/or enforceable. Implicitly, it 
is known that the probability that the random number chosen by a user will be 
known to someone else is the probability that if each were to choose randomly 
from the same set using the same probability distribution, they would get 
the same value. Thus the assumption about what random means is neither 
verifiable nor enforceable. Besides, there is no method to prevent anyone from 
divulging anything they know with anyone they trust.
As a result one inference that can be derived for protocols is: In any pro­
tocol that calls for the generation of a random number, it is essential in the 
analysis of the protocol to determine whether there are deceptions that could 
be either carried out or furthered if the random value were shared with one or 
more of the other participants - but in secret from some of them.
2.2.2 Low Exponent Protocol Failure
The example considered here is that of a protocol using RSA [18]. It uses 
a small public key exponent in order to accomplish fast and cost-effective 
encryption operations.
The general environment of this protocol is a large communications network 
in which the messages transmitted between two users should not be readable to 
other users. In the protocol, the ith user has to choose two large primes pi and 
qi and publish their product rii as the modulus for the RSA algorithm used for 
communication with him. An encryption/decryption pair { e,-, di } is chosen 
and one of these, e.g., di is published. If the encryption exponent chosen is 
a small integer, as can very well be the case as then the implementation is 
quicker and simpler, this can cause the protocol to fail as shown below.
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If the exponent is d and the same message M is sent to d users, then the 
protocol is susceptible to failure. This is illustrated in the case when d =  3. 
Suppose that user 1 whose public exponent is 3 decides to send a message M 
to users 2, 3 and 4. The ciphertexts in those cases are:
C2 =  M 3 mod n2
C3 — M 3 mod n3
C4 =  M 3 mod n4
In the case when n2, n3 and n4 are relatively prime, the Chinese Remainder 
theorem will enable the calculation of M 3 mod (n2, n3, n4) from C2, C3, 
C4. But since M 3 < n2n3n4, M’s value can be recovered. If n2, n3, n4 are 
not relatively prime, then attacks from the common modulus protocol apply. 
The various types of attacks on an RSA based protocol employing a common 
modulus are given in [8]. Thus it can be seen that even an intruder has enough 
information to recover the message.
A method to salvage the protocol from this attack is to never send exactly 
the same message. For this an additional variable like a timestamp is concate­
nated to the message before encrypting it. Using the scheme, the modified 
ciphertexts from the above example would be:
C2 =  ( 2 T t2) mod n2 
C3 =  (2 ^ A i + t3)3 mod n3 
C4 =  ( 2 +  t4) mod n4
where ¿2, t3 and t4 are the timestamps associated with each message. How­
ever Hastad [19] has shown that even this may not vary the plaintext enough
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to overcome the weakness in this protocol. Hastad showed in his paper that a 
system of modular equations
Pi(x) =  0 mod rii, 1 <  i < k
of degrees no greater than d can be solved in polynomial time if the number 
of equations is at least d (d + l)/2 . In the case with an exponent of 3 if the 
message is sent to a minimum of 7 users of the network, the message may no 
longer be a secret to an intruder. However the timestamps must be known and 
this is assumed as they can be estimated before Hastad’s algorithm is applied 
as they form a small number of bits in the entire message bit string.
The above protocol failure emphasizes the need for the designer of a proto­
col to consider information which can be gained from a collection of ciphertexts 
whose plaintexts are related (in this case equal or differing only by timestamps) 
or whose keys are related (in this case the same exponent with relatively prime 
moduli).
2.2.3 The Low Entropy Protocol Failure
The two protocol failures considered so far were mainly due to some mathe­
matical properties of the cryptoalgorithms used in them. However this is not 
the reason for all possible failures. We show an example of a failure which is 
not dependent upon the cryptoalgorithm used.
In a public key system being used to provide a secrecy channel for a pro­
tocol, the encryption key is publicly known so any message encrypted with 
it can only be understood by the intended recipient who possesses the pri­
vate decryption key. But if the number of valid and meaningful messages is 
small, then an opponent could precompute the encryption of those messages. 
Then when an encrypted message is sent through the channel, it is sufficient
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to search through the table of precomputed values to establish the meaning of 
the message. The complexity of the above task depends directly on the size of 
the message space. The message space must be large enough to preclude an at­
tack in which the set of all messages is pre-encrypted by an opponent who can 
intercept a ciphertext and recover the corresponding plaintext by exhaustive 
search.
However the encryption of all messages in the space is not required. If 
the ciphertext for a significant portion of the space is precomputed, the mean­
ing of a given ciphertext can be discerned by simple pattern matching of the 
ciphertext with the precomputed table values, whenever possible, without de­
crypting the rest of the message. To establish what the term significant in this 
context means, we use the term entropy. Entropy is a measure of uncertainty 
in the message space. If the message space has low entropy, small amount of 
information about a given message is enough to reveal the message.
In their paper Holdridge and Simmons [20] show a protocol failure in an ap­
plication proposed by Bell Telephone Laboratories for use in secure telephony 
[21, 22]. This system is based on public key encryption for subscribers on a 
mobile radio telephone network. Public encryption keys of all subscribers are 
stored in a public key directory whereas their decryption keys are kept secret. 
The communication from one subscriber to another is done as follows. A sam­
pled and digitized speech signal of the sender is encrypted with his encryption 
key from the public directory. The receiver uses his private decryption key to 
obtain the plaintext message.
The problem with this system is that voice signals have a rather narrow 
bandwidth, thus enabling attacks on them. Redundancy of the language, and 
the the inter-symbol and inter-word dependencies are useful clues in ascertain­
ing the meaning of a sample of corrupted speech signals. Thus the protocol
20
fails to provide the required secrecy.
In the case of this failure, the public key algorithm used has no role in 
the failure. The underlying cryptosystem was not broken, but still the secrecy 
channel failed. It is merely a failure of the protocol, which is the use of a public 
key encryption system to protect messages drawn from a message space with 
low entropy, to provide the required privacy.
2.2.4 Single Key Protocol Failure
All the protocol failure cases considered so far have used public key algorithms. 
To show that even conventional single key encryption systems are prone to 
protocol failures, we consider a protocol using DES [23], which fails to provide 
the required authentication.
Message Authentication Codes and Manipulation Detection Codes have 
been used to convince the receiver of a message that indeed the message was not 
manipulated by an intruder during its transmission over an insecure channel. 
A message authentication code (MAC) uses a modified encryption function 
with a secret key different from that used to encrypt the message. It is typ­
ically small so as to keep the size of the total message to the minimum. A 
manipulation detection code (MDC) uses a function with no secret key.
A protocol for protecting information using DES with an MDC was pro­
posed for inclusion in a federal data communications standard [24]. It was 
simple and appealing until it was discovered that it failed to detect several 
manipulations.
The protocol works as follows. The data to be transmitted is divided into 
n blocks of k bits each, where k varies between 1 and 64. Let these plaintext 
blocks be X 1: X 2, .... X n. Ciphertext blocks Y[, y2, .... Yn are formed from 
them using a suitable mode of DES, e.g., one of the chaining modes of DES. An
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MDC Yn + 1 is formed which is the exclusive-OR sum of the n plaintext blocks. 
This block is used by the receiver to verify that the data received were indeed 
not tampered with during transmission. The receiver decrypts the data and 
computes an exclusive-OR sum of them and compares the result to the MDC. 
If they agree, then he will conclude that the ciphertext was not manipulated.
The failure in this protocol is illustrated using the Cipher Block Chaining 
mode of DES [8]. In this mode a 64 bit initialization vector Y0 and a 56 bit key 
are exchanged secretly between the communicants. The n ciphertext blocks 
Y\, Y<i, Yn each of 64 bits are calculated as:
Yi =  Yi. 1 e E ( K , X i)
where E(K, X{)  represents encryption with DES under key K  of the mes­
sage X{.  The MDC is calculated as:
Yn+1 = ® U X i
At the receiver’s end the first n blocks Zi, Z 2 , Zn are decrypted using 
the reverse operation:
W{+i =  Wi ® D { K , Z i )
where D(K, Zt-) represents decryption with DES under key K  of the message 
Z{. Then the exclusive-OR sum of these n blocks is formed and compared to 
Yn+l. If they agree then the receiver would conclude that the message had not 
been manipulated. Since the check merely confirms that 0  X{ =  © VE, an 
intruder could modify the message say by interchanging some of the blocks, 
since their sum would still be the same.
Blocks can even be inserted into the message as long as they are done 
in pairs. This is because the exclusive-OR sum of a block with itself is zero
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and therefore the MDC will not be affected. One example is of an intruder 
knowing an encrypted block of data that if added could change the value of 
a deposit from $1,000 to $1,000,000 in a message without the change being 
detected at the receiving end. Although the effect of such failures depends on 
the particular application, the basic inference is that the protocol has failed to 
provide adequate protection against undiscovered manipulation.
2.3 Summary and Further Analysis
A number of protocol failures have been surveyed in the previous section. The 
intention in studying them is to throw light on learning certain basic principles 
to be applied during the design of protocols. The distinction between the 
breaking of cryptosystems and failure of protocols is important. A protocol 
failure can lead to the definition of new guidelines for the use of a particular 
set or class of algorithms whereas a broken cryptosystem results in the rejection 
of the given algorithm from consideration by protocol designers.
With the help of protocol failures seen so far, some general principles for 
protocol analysis can be derived. They are described in detail as principles of 
cryptanalysis in [16]. They are outlined here as:
1. All the properties of all the quantities involved in the protocol must 
be carefully enumerated, including explicit assumptions in the protocol 
specification and implicit assumptions in the protocol setting.
2. No properties must be accepted unless accompanied by a proof to verify 
or enforce them. For each possible violation of a property, the protocol 
must be critically examined to see if this creates any difference in the 
outcome of the execution of the protocol. Combinations of parameters 
as well as single parameters must be considered.
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3. In the final analysis, if the outcome of exercising the protocol can be 
influenced as a result of the violation of one or more assumed properties, 
the next step is to determine whether this fact can be exploited to cause 
a sensible deception. For example in the Diffie-Heilman key exchange 
protocol [25], it is possible to influence the outcome by violating the 
assumed properties of one or more of the parameters involved, but this 
does not result in any reasonable deception. A protocol failure is said to 
occur whenever the function of the protocol can be subverted as a result 
of any possible violations.
Similar conclusions are drawn for making security systems and protocols 
robust [27], The essence of robustness in security systems is explicitness. Cryp­
tographic protocols interact in ways that break security when their designers 
do not specify the required properties explicitly and protocol failures occur 
because naming, freshness and chaining properties are assumed implicitly to 
hold between two parties. However just making every security property about 
a system explicit is not a solution to building robust and hence failure resis­
tant systems. The more aspects of any system are made explicit, the more 
information its designer has to deal with. This is equally applicable to design 
and evaluation of security systems.
The purpose of these guidelines is to clarify the setting which the protocol 
designer may have assumed would exist for the application of the protocol and 
also aid in the clarification of the purpose of each assumption or property, aid 
in identifying the most crucial elements in the protocol and make the modifica­
tion of the protocol simpler to accomplish, if actually in implementation some 
assumption cannot be satisfied. These guidelines are not expected to prevent 
protocol failures by themselves, but help in the early detection of flaws.
In the following chapters we will see how these principles are incorporated
24




Formal Analysis of Protocols 
and G N Y Logic
3.1 Formal Analysis Methods
As we have seen in the previous chapter, protocols which are not designed 
correctly are prone to attack and consequently they may not be able to provide 
the secrecy and/or authentication required of them. Such security flaws are 
subtle and hard to find and examples exist in literature to show that such 
flaws were not discovered for some time despite extensive manual analysis on 
the concerned protocols. One example is of the flaw in Needham-Schroeder 
conventional key protocol, in which an intruder masquerades as a genuine 
participant and passes an old compromised key as a good new one. Another 
example is of a protocol in the CCITT X.509 draft standard [10] for which 
Burrows, Abadi and Needham [4] showed that an intruder could make an old 
session key be accepted as a new one. There are numerous other undocumented 
examples.
These kinds of problems in protocols are well suited for the application
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of formal methods. Due to the variety and counterintuitiveness of the flaws, 
an informal analysis may be too prone to error to be reliable. On the other 
hand, since the protocols are well contained, modeling and analyzing them is 
tractable enough so that formal methods can be applied. The use of formal 
methods in analysis of cryptographic protocols has become widespread since 
the beginning of the nineties, as more and more undiscovered security flaws 
were found using formal analysis techniques.
Formal methods in the analysis of cryptographic protocols have commonly 
followed two approaches
1. Methods based on communicating state machines
2. Systems based on modal logics of knowledge and belief
3.1.1 Methods based on communicating state machines
These methods are based on representing a protocol as a set of communicating 
state machines, one per each party in the protocol. The inputs and outputs of 
these machines are messages directed to each other. A party represented by 
a state machine can advance from one state to another due to an event. An 
event is caused by the sending or receiving of a message.
The starting point for most versions of the state machine approach has 
been the work of Dolev and Yao [6]. In the Dolev and Yao model, the network 
is assumed to be under the control of an intruder who can intercept all traffic, 
create, alter and destroy messages and perform any operations such as encryp­
tion that is available to legitimate users of the system. However, initially the 
intruder is assumed not to know any secret information such as encryption 
keys of honest users in the system. The goal of the intruder is to find a word 
that is meant to be secret.
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The main drawbacks of the Dolev and Yao model are that it can be used 
only to detect secrecy failures and that it does not allow modeling of partic­
ipants’ behaviour from one state to another. Most of the tools that use this 
model use a mechanism to describe the behaviour of the protocol participants. 
One of the earliest systems to use the Dolev and Yao model is the Interrogator 
developed by Millen et al [7]. We will discuss this system in detail in the next 
chapter but stated briefly, the Interrogator attempts to find security flaws in 
protocols by an exhaustive search of the state space.
3.1.2 Systems based on modal logics
The other formal approach in the analysis of cryptographic protocols is to 
use modal logics similar to those that have been developed for the analysis 
of the evolution of knowledge and belief in distributed systems. In such a 
logic, there are various statements about belief in, or knowledge of, messages 
in a distributed system and inference rules which can be used to derive beliefs 
and/or knowledge from other beliefs and knowledge. One of the best known 
and widely used among such logics is the BAN logic, due to Burrows, Abadi 
and Needham [4].
In BAN, an initial set of beliefs is assumed. The beliefs are updated as a 
result of further messages sent and received in the protocol. Using the BAN 
inference rules, the set of beliefs is expanded to include beliefs that can be 
derived using the initial beliefs and the beliefs obtained as a result of the 
most recent message. Finally, if the set of beliefs includes belief statements 
representing the goal of the protocol, then the protocol is assumed to be secure. 
BAN logic is simple and easy to apply, but among the many drawbacks it has 
are that, it does not differentiate between seeing a message and understanding 
it. The logic assumes that all principals are honest and go by the rules of
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the protocol and it does not model knowledge and therefore no results about 
secrecy can be derived, using it.
The approach taken by Gong, Needham and Yahalom [5] in the GNY logic 
is to increase the scope of BAN logic itself, in order to increase its effective­
ness. This logic includes a notion of recognizability that allows a principal 
to reason about the content of messages it expects to receive, and constructs 
for establishing honesty of principals, among other improvements. A detailed 
discussion of the GNY logic can be found in section 2.3 of this chapter.
3.2 BAN Logic
BAN logic is a modal logic representing beliefs of participants in a protocol. 
Three types of objects are dealt with : principals, keys and nonces. Basi­
cally BAN logic builds upon statements about messages sent and received 
throughout the protocol. In an analysis of a protocol, an initial set of beliefs is 
assumed. Beliefs are statements about the current status of each principal or 
participant in the protocol. Each message received is mapped to another set 
of beliefs. Then the Inference Rules of BAN [4] are applied to derive a new set 
of beliefs attained from the initial beliefs and those gained by the message just 
conveyed. If the set of beliefs finally attained can convey that the protocol 
goal is achieved, then the protocol is assumed correct. If the set of beliefs 
is inadequate, then this suggests inadequacy of protocol statements or initial 
assumptions.
Since the conventional notation of protocol message representation is not 
convenient for manipulation in the logic, each message is transformed into 
a logical formula. This formula is annotated with assertions. An assertion 
usually describes beliefs held by the principals at the point in the protocol
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where the assertion is inserted. A detailed description of basic constructs and 
inference rules can be found in [4]. Here we describe them briefly.
3.2.1 Formulae
P ^  X : P believes X. P believes that X is true.
P < X : P sees X. P has received a message containing X.
P |~ X : P once said X. P has sent a message containing X.
P => X : P has jurisdiction over X. P is a trusted or delegated authority on X.
J(X) : X is fresh. No message sent in the past contained X.
P Q : K is a shared key between P and Q. No one except P or Q or someone
they trust can know K.
P : K is a public key of P. A"-1 , the matching secret key will not be discovered 
by anyone other than P or someone trusted by P.
P ^  Q : X is a secret known to P and Q or to principals trusted by them. 
{ X } k • X is encrypted under key K. It is assumed that { X } k originates from 
a principal P.
(Xy)  '• X is combined with formula Y. This proves the identity of the originator 
of this formula.
3.2.2 Inference Rules
The Inference rules of the logic capture the basic principles used in the design 
of protocols. An inference rule is written as,
X u ....., X n
Y  ’
and serves to explain that if Ah, ....., X n hold then Y is true.
There are three basic inference rules in the BAN logic :
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1. Message Meaning - The message meaning rule for shared keys states 
that the identity of the sender of an encrypted message can be deduced 
from the encryption key used :
P ^ Q & P , P < { X } k
P ^ Q ^ X
(3.1)
with P ^  R where P < { V } a' from R is implied.
2. Nonce Verification - This rule expresses the check that a message is 
recent and hence that the sender still believes in it :
P£$(X),P£Q^X 
p ^ Q ^ x
that is, if P believes that X could have been uttered only recently and 
that Q once said X, then P believes that Q has said X recently, and hence 
that Q believes X.
3. Jurisdiction  - This rule states that one must believe what a trusted 
principal believes in :
X . P ^ Q ^ X  
P\b X
that is, if P believes that Q has jurisdiction over X and P believes that 




In the actual analysis, each protocol step is transformed into an idealized form. 
For instance, the concrete protocol step A —► B : {A,  K ab}Kbs is idealized as 
A —► B : { A  B } Kb and thus the formula B < { A ^  B } K^ holds, when 
the message is received by B. In the protocol analysis the following steps are 
followed:
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• The idealized protocol is derived from the original one.
• Assumptions about the initial state are written.
• The goal of the protocol is written as a set of logical formulae.
• Logical formulae describing the state of the system are attached as as­
sertions after each protocol statement.
• Logical postulates (Inference Rules) are applied to the assumptions and 
assertions to discover the beliefs held by the protocol participants.
The beliefs held by all the participants, obtained by applying the logical 
postulates to the assertions at the end of the last step help in determining 
whether the protocol has achieved its desired goal or not.
The protocol achieves its goal if the set of beliefs obtained after the last 
step of the protocol include the formulae specifying the goal of the protocol.
3.3 G NY logic
GNY logic can be seen as an extension of BAN. The GNY logic [5] is more 
expressive than BAN logic. It does not, for example assume that redundancy is 
always present in encrypted messages and instead it incorporates a new notion 
of recognizability which captures a recipient’s expectation of the contents of 
messages to be received.
GNY logic distinguishes between what one possesses and what one believes 
in. This allows the content of the message and the information implied by it 
to be treated separately. Some of the existing notions in BAN are modified 
and made to correspond more naturally to execution states and are thus more 
intuitive. For example, plaintext formulae which are not considered to be
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useful in BAN are treated similar to encrypted formulae in GNY as they can 
in some cases be used to derive further conclusions. The logic also has new 
notation to represent functions other than encryption, such as decryption and 
one way hash functions and new notation for denoting private keys associated 
with public keys. The GNY logic thus assists in the analysis of a wider range 
of protocols.
The three most notable notions which can be represented explicitly in GNY 
logic, are discussed below.
3.3.1 Possession
This notion allows reasoning at a finer level of detail than BAN logic. This 
notion is implicit in many BAN rules. Consider the message decryption rule 
for shared keys [4].
P £ P & Q , P < { X } k 
P<iX
It is implicitly assumed that P has K. There is a distinction in possessing 
a key and believing anything about it. In GNY, we have the construct P 3 X, 
meaning P possesses X, to represent this fact.
3.3.2 Recognizability
In BAN, sufficient redundancy in messages is assumed so that decryption of a 
ciphertext with the correct key results in a recognizable message. This is not 
assumed in GNY logic and instead a construct P ^  </>(X) is introduced, which 
denotes that P believes that X is recognizable. This explicates the expectations 
of P about X before actual receipt of the message.
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3.3.3 Honesty
BAN logic assumes that principals participating in a protocol are honest. It can 
be inferred from the nonce-verification rule wherein a principal who recently 
said a message is assumed to believe in the message. To make the notion of 
honesty explicit, GNY logic introduces a construct P ^  Q =>> Q ^  * which 
means that P believes Q to be honest and competent.
Another feature GNY logic provides is that it dispenses with the separate 
notations for shared keys and shared secrets in BAN and provides a common 
syntax P Q with the semantical interpretation that S is a suitable secret 
for P and Q.
Along with the three main notions, an important concept in GNY logic is 
beliefs about others’ beliefs, which is briefly described below.
Beliefs about others’ beliefs
Each principal in a protocol expresses his beliefs by sending messages and as 
such the beliefs held by the sender are preconditions for the message to be 
sent. A message of the same form may carry different meanings in different 
protocols, depending upon the context. If a receiver of a message believes that 
the sender is honest and competent then he may believe in the beliefs held by 
the sender. Therefore depending upon levels of trust, reasoning about beliefs 
can be achieved.
A complete list of GNY postulates can be found in [5].
3.3.4 Protocol Analysis Using GNY Logic
Protocols are typically described by listing messages sent between the prin­
cipals and by symbolically showing the source, destination and contents of
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each message. A simple transformation is required to attain a form suitable 
for manipulation in GNY logic. The steps required in the transformation are 
described below.
Not-originated-here formulae
The first step in the protocol analysis is related to the fact that a typical 
protocol description does not distinguish between X and *X. P < *X means 
that P is not the first one to convey X in the current run of the protocol.This 
aspect is entirely implicit in the standard protocol description. In order to 
avoid a much more complex form of logic, a parser is used to insert the star’s 
in a protocol description.
Parser
The parser has to perform the following operations. For each line in the de­
scription of the form A —» B : X, if B — A, this results in an error condition; 
otherwise this statement is split into two statements : A |~ X and B < X. For 
each complete formula Y which forms part of the line B < X, if Y does not 
first appear in a line A |~ X in the protocol, a star in inserted before Y. The 
parser would also mark (*X, *Y) instead of a more compact *(X, Y). After 
this procedure, the parser drops all lines of the type A X.
Message Extensions
The descriptions that specify when a particular principal should proceed, for 
example certain conditions being met or certain beliefs being held, are often 
given verbally along with the standard protocol description. A method is 
needed to represent such preconditions to a formula within the logic. Message 
extensions are defined for this purpose. In X ^  C the precondition for the
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formula X is represented by statement C which is a message extension. Hence 
the verbal explanations associated with protocol descriptions are translated 
into the logic and inserted after the formula. Message extensions are to be 
appended for every formula in a protocol message. The methodology of ap­
pending message extensions to messages will be discussed in the chapter 4, 
when its implementation is discussed. It is assumed for the sake of simplicity 
that a formula without a star prefix has no extension appended to it, as no 
new conclusions should be derivable from such a formula, which is already 
conveyed.
Annotated Assertions
A protocol is a sequence of told statements Ci, C2 , ...., Cn each of the form 
P <1 X. An annotation for a protocol consists of a sequence of assertions and 
conjunctions of statements, inserted before the first told statement and after 
each told statement. The first assertion contains the assumptions and the last 
contains the conclusions. The assertions are derived by syntactic application 
of GNY postulates [5] to statements. The assertions obtained at the end of a 
given protocol represent the final positions of all principals and these are used 
to determine if the protocol under consideration has achieved its goal or not.
3.4 Example of GNY Analysis
We now show an example of the GNY reasoning process by analyzing the 
Needham-Schroeder conventional key protocol. This protocol has influenced 
the design of a significant number of existing systems and published protocols. 
It also serves as one of the examples in the BAN logic paper [4]. We will see 
the differences between the BAN and GNY approaches and the advantages
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that GNY offers.
The goal of Needham-Schroeder protocol is for two principals A and B to 
be provided with a shared secret key [1, 4], which would be subsequently used 
as a session key. A trusted Authentication Server S shares common secrets 
with all participants and can generate good quality session keys. The goal of 
the protocol is that at the end of the protocol, each principal should possess a 
session key and be convinced in the goodness of that key. Additionally, each 
principal may be required to believe something about the state of the other 
principal. This may include believing that the other principal possesses the 
key or that it believes in the validity of the possessed key.
The Needham-Schroeder protocol consists of the following messages :-
1. A —> S : A, B, iVa
2. S —» A : {N a, B, K ab, { K ab, A}Kbs}Kas
3. A —> B : { K ab, A}Kbg
4. B —> A : {N b} Kab
5. A —> B : {Nb — l}A'a6
Na and Nb are nonces for A and B respectively, K as and K\>s are the secret 
keys between A and S and B and S respectively. K ab is the session key for A 
and B generated by S. Message extensions are added to the above messages 
which serve to replace the verbal explanations accompanying the run of the 
protocol. F is used to denote the decrement computation. The following 
idealized description of Needham-Schroeder protocol is thus obtained using 
the GNY parser.
1. S < : *A, *B, *Na
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2. A < : * {N a, B, *K ab, *{K<tb, ^ } a'6, S ^  A m -6 B } k S ^  A B
3. B < : S ^  A B
4. A < : * { * M } Â
5. B < : * {*F (N b) } Kab A f= A ^  B
The above idealized description is obtained by using the steps outlined in 
the previous section.
3.4.1 Protocol Analysis
We have the following initial assumptions 
A 3 K aSi A 3 Na
A ^  A S, A ^  tt(Aa), A ^  </>(Aa)
B 3 A f>s, B 3
B |= B &  S, B |= #(JV6), B ^  <j>{Nb)
That is each principal possesses a secret key and believes it is a good key 
between himself and the authentication server. He also possesses a nonce and 
believes it to be fresh. In addition, A and B believe their nonces Na and At 
to be recognizable, respectively.
A |ee S => (A Ib b B), A ^  S => S |= *,
A B =j. B |= *.
B |= S => (A B), B ^  S => S |= *,
B ^  A => A ^  *.
A and B believe that S has jurisdiction over quality secrets to be shared 
between them. A and B also believe S to be honest and competent. Moreover, 
A believes that B is honest and competent and B believes that A is honest 
and competent. These two assumptions are not necessary but as will be seen
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below, the added trust implied by these assumptions enables A and B to attain 
stronger final positions.
S 9 Kas, S 9 Kbsi S 9 Kab 
S 1= A ’b  S, S 1= B l&  S, S f= A B
S possesses valid keys with A and B and he also believes that they are 
secret with A and B respectively. S also believes that K ab is a suitable key 
between A and B.
Now, we apply the postulates to each message. The postulates of GNY 
used in this analysis are given for reference in the appendix to this chapter. 
Message 1
Applying Being-told rule 1 (T l) and Possession rule 1 (PI), we obtain S 9 
(A, B, Na), meaning S possesses A, B, and Na.
Message 2
The extension to the message, S ^  A B is valid because it holds when 
the message is sent, as it is part of the initial assumptions. Also S is sure that 
the recipient A will be sure that K ab is a key for himself and B (and no other 
principal) as B ’s name is also included in the message.
By applying Being-told rules 1 (T l) and 3 (T3) and Possession rule 1 (PI), 
we get
A 3 { N a,B ,K ah, { K ah,A } Kbs)
that is A possesses the contents of the message.
Applying Being-told rule 2 (T2), we get A 9 Kab, that is A possesses the 
key I<ab.
Applying Freshness rule 1 (FI), we obtain
A N H(^a, B , K ab, {K ab, ^ } a'6s)
A believes that the message is fresh and recently generated.
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Applying Recognizability Rule 1 (R l), we get
A |= </>(Na, B, K ab, {I<ah a ) k J
that is A believes that the contents of the message are recognizable. 
Applying Message Interpretation rule 1 (II), we get
A \ = S ^ ( N a,B J < ab, { K ahA }KJ .
A believes that S once said the message.
Applying Jurisdiction rule 2 (J2), we obtain
A |s 5  |= A B
A believes that S believes that K ab is a good key between A and B. 
Applying Jurisdiction rule 1 (Jl), we obtain
A |= A lb b B
that is A believes that K ab is a good key between A and B.
Message 3
It can be seen that the extension S ^  A *1$ B is valid.
Applying Being-told rules 1 (T l) and 3 (T3) and Possession rule 1 (PI), 
we obtain B 9 K ab. B possesses K ab-
We are not able to derive new beliefs from this message. Particularly, we 
cannot say that the contents of message 3 are fresh. For B, it would seem as 
if message 3 is a replay of a message from a previous run of the protocol. In 
BAN analysis of the above message, we could conclude that S once said the 
message, but we cannot conclude similarly in GNY analysis and so B is not 
sure that the message originated from S and cannot convince himself of S’s 
beliefs and cannot make use of the extension to the message.
Message 4
40
Applying Being-told rules 1 (T l) and 3 (T3) and Possession rule 1 (PI), 
we obtain A 3 Nb. A possesses Nb.
No further conclusions can be derived. Although K ab is used in the message 
for encryption, A does not know who sent the message or that B now possesses 
the key. The reason is Nb is a random number, not recognizable to A. 
Message 5
None of the GNY postulates lead us to any beliefs or possessions from this 
message. B cannot even be convinced that the message originated from A, 
although possessing K ab, the contents of the message are recognizable to B 
(Recognizability rule 1 (R l)). Finally, B is not convinced that he shares the 
key K ab with A.
It can thus be concluded from our reasoning that given the first three 
messages of the protocol, the last two messages attain nothing of use and can 
thus be eliminated without weakening the final position attained, originally. 
Summarising, we have the following conclusions :
A 9 K ab-, A ^  A <Ab B 
B 3 Kab
A possesses and believes in the secret key but B possesses the secret key 
but cannot believe in it. Neither A nor B believe anything about each other. 
As can be seen, the original goal of the protocol, that is A and B share a key 
K abi believe that it is suitable for them and mutually believe that the other 
principal also believes in its suitability, is not achieved.
3.5 Appendix
In this appendix, we list all the GNY logic postulates.
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3.6 GNY logic rules
3.6.1 Rationality rule
This rule basically states that the set of GNY postulates can be expanded to 
permit reasoning about a principal’s beliefs regarding the state of other prin­
cipals.
If C lC2 is a rule, then for any principal P, so is
P N C ]
p N c2-
3.6.2 Being-Told Rules
This set of rules help in determining whether a principal P is told a component 





p  < ( x ,  Y) 
P < X
T3 P < { X } K, P b K  
P « X
T4 P < { X } +K, p b - k
P < X
T5
P < F ( X , Y ) ,  P 3 X  
P c Y




This set of rules aid in determining what a principal P possesses as a result of 
some other possession or possessions.
PI
P < X  
P 3 X
P2 P 3 X,  P b Y 
P 3 (X,Y) ,  P 3 F(X,  Y)
P3
P B ( X , Y )
P 3 X
P4
P 3 X  
P 3 H(X)
P5
PBF{ X, Y) ,  P 3 X  
P 3 Y
P6
P 3 K , P 3 X  
P 3 { X } K, P 3 { X } £
P 3 +K,  P 3 X  
P  ̂ { X} +k
P 3 —K, P 3  
P 3 { X } .
3.6.4 Freshness Rules
This set of rules help in determining a principal P ’s beliefs of freshness of a 
message as a result of a belief in the freshness of one of its components or 
freshness of a function of that message.
FI p N t(x)
P ^ i ( X , Y ) ,  P £ t ( F ( X ) )
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F2 p  » (* ) ,  P B K
p  |= K W *)>  p  N K m 1)
F3 p  i= K-y), p  g + /r
P  |= K W + k )
F4 P  |= »(* ), P  3 - *  
p  N K W - * )
F5 p  N »(+*) 
p  N
F6 p  N t(-i<) 
p N U+K)
P )= <f>(X), P |= i(I{), P 3 K 
P |= # ({* }* ) , P N K W * )
F8 P |= 4( X) ,  p  N H(+AQ, p  3 + K
p N K W + k )
F9
P [= ^(AQ, P |= » (-jif) , P 9 - K
P N #({A->_«-)
P N t K * ) ,  P 3 X
fN P ffl)
Fl l P N P W ) ,  f P W
^  N #(*)
3.6.5 Recognizability Rules
These rules help in determining whether a principal P recognizes a message as 
a result of recognizing a component, or a function of that message.
R1 P N <K*)
P\=<t>(X,Y), P£<j >( F( X) )
R2 P M ( X ) ,  p * k  
p m ( W a ), P N ^ m 1)
44
P Ë <KX), P 3 + K  




P |= <t>{X), P 3 - K  
P M <K{X} .k )
P |= (¡>{X), P 3 X  
p  N <KH(X))
P 3 H{X)
P |= </>(X)
3.6.6 Message Interpretation Rules
These rules aid in determining new beliefs for a principal P, given an initial 








P < * { X } K, P B K, P ^ P & Q ,  P £  <j>(X), P |= t (X,K)
P N <2 b  V  P N Q h  {x } K, p  N Q  ̂ k
P< * { X , < S > } +K, P 5 ( - K , S ) ,  P ^ P ^ Q ,  P b  4>(X,S), P M
P ^ Q ^ ( X , < S > ) ,  P £ Q \ ^ { X , < S > } + k , P È Q 3 + K
P < *H(X, < S >), P 3 {X, S), P ^ P ^ Q ,  P\ee i(X, S)
P\b Q \ ~ ( X , < S > ) ,  P £ Q ^ H ( X , < S > )
p < {v}-/', p  ̂+R, p Qi p N fijx)
P N <2 b  V  { X } - k
p  < p   ̂ + k , p  Q, P N t(X) ,  p  N » ( V +K)
P £ Q 3  (—K,X)
P N Q b  V  P b  t(X)
P ^  Q  ̂X
P £ Q ^ ( X , Y )
P N<2 b *
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3.6.7 Jurisdiction Rules
These rules help in determining conclusions derived by a principal P as a result 






p ^ Q ' t (x ^ C ) ,  p |e e t ( x )
P ^ Q ^ C
f  N g K Q N  h p  ^ q \e Q\e C
P\^Q\e C
3.6.8 Never-Originated-Here Messages
These rules result in the derivation of beliefs for a principal P about a com­
ponent of a message which he/she has received and believes that it is not 
originated by himself/herself (denoted by P ^  ®(P)).
T , p < {X} k , P ^ K ,  P |= P £  Q, </.(*), P N (8 (f)
P N Q K ,  p ^ q ^ { x } k
, P < { X , < S > ) + K, P 3 (S, —K), P £ t $ P ,  P ^ P & Q ,  P£<f>(X,S),
P £ Q \ ^ ( X , < S > ) ,  P ^ Q < r { X , < S  > }+K-
, P < H(X, < S >), P 3 (X,S), P ^ P & Q ,  P^<j>(X,S), P M ( f )  




Protocol analysis using formal analysis methods is often a tedious process to 
be done manually. For example methods using the Dolev-Yao model [6] use 
a system of communicating state machines and model an intruder who is in 
complete control of the system with the ability to read, alter and destroy 
messages, create new messages and perform legitimate operations such as en­
cryption. Such systems involve considerable amount of data storage on the 
part of each of the principals and the intruder. Besides, storage space may 
also be required for messages in transit, either between each pair of principals 
or in general for every message sent and received. Additionally, many opera­
tions relating to communicating finite state machines are not well-suited for 
manual use. If the goal of the intruder in the model is to find out a secret word, 
this entails searching in a word space, which is infinite for protocols normally 
considered. All these suggest the development of systems for protocol analysis 
using machine assistance.
Systems based on modal logics consist of the systematic application of the 
inference rules of the logic to an idealized description of protocol messages. 
When applied for the first time, these logics may reveal missing assumptions
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or redundancies in a protocol. The next step would be to revise the assump­
tions or modify the original protocol and reapply the inference rules to see if 
the desired goal of the protocol is then attainable. This process of applying 
and reapplying the inference rules is cumbersome and prone to errors, if done 
manually. Thus the need to automate the process was felt and a number of 
tools have been proposed to automate BAN logic [29, 12]. A tool to automate 
GNY logic is also developed [13] and will be discussed in section 3.1.2.
The importance of automating formal analysis of protocols is thus seen and 
we will describe some of the current work in this area and the need for further 
automation, in the rest of the sections of this chapter.
4.1 Current Developments
4.1.1 The Interrogator
The Interrogator [7] is a tool written in Prolog to detect vulnerabilities in 
a protocol. Given a protocol specification and a goal for the penetrator, it 
searches for a scenario using penetrator actions that achieves the desired goal. 
The highlight of the tool is that it prints a history of messages sent and modified 
which enables the user to actually view how the penetration was done and 
evaluate its feasibility and introduce possible measures to prevent such an 
occurrence. The tool performs an exhaustive search for penetrations within 
the allowed possibilities but avoids search paths that are evidently futile.
The Interrogator is one of the earliest tools to provide facilities to perform 
automated security analysis of protocols. The tool has a deep theoretical basis 
and is implemented in Prolog. It has a number of graphical user interface 
(GUI) features that enhance the automation process. This is described in 
more detail so as to offer a comparison with the GUI tool we propose and
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describe in detail, later in this chapter.
The more salient features of the tool are explained below.
Communicating Finite State Machines
The Interrogator assumes each principal as a communicating finite state ma­
chine. The inputs and outputs of these machines are directed towards each 
other. Every message sent or received is an event and every event causes a 
state transition. Initially, each process or machine is assumed to be in a cer­
tain initial state. The various events occurring during the run of the protocol,
i.e., the various messages sent and received in the protocol cause advancement 
from one state to another for all the affected principals (processes).
We assume an environment in which the intruder has complete control,
i.e., he can inject new messages, and intercept or modify existing messages. 
Therefore sending and receiving a message are two separate events. A sent 
message may have been lost or a received message may have not been sent by 
a legitimate party and so on.
Transitions
Internally, the protocol description is converted and stored as a set of transi­
tions. Transitions are specified as transmit or receive relations among process 
states or messages. The transmit relation defines state transitions caused by 
sending messages whereas the receive relation defines state transitions caused 
by receiving messages.
The transmit relation is specified as:
transmit^!, m, 5 2 )
which means that if a message m is sent by a process and s\ is its state 
before the message is sent, then s2 is its state after the message is sent.
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The receive relation is similarly specified as:
receive(si, m, s2)
where the message m sent by the sending process causes it to advance from 
a state si to 52-
State Structure
The essence of the system is the information carried by a protocol state. The 
following structure is used to represent the state attained by each principal 
(process):
[party, stateJabel, iterrii, itemn\
The first element is the name or address of the principal and the second 
element is a state label. The rest of the elements are a list of data items that 
the process must retain. The state label is typically a mnemonic identifier 
such as OPEN or CLOSED or just an unique integer. When a message is sent 
or received the state label changes to the next one and some data items may 
be removed or more added. Sending a message may cause some items to be 
dropped and receiving a message may cause some items to be added to the 
list.
Message Structure
A message is represented as a list of fields. Each field is either a simple com­
ponent or an encrypted component. An encrypted component is symbolically 
shown by prefixing the list of subfields being encrypted, by the key. The first 
two fields of the message are assumed to be source and destination addresses. 
An address is a party identifier type.
Thus message has the form :
[source, destination, fieldi, ...., fieldn\
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An encrypted component has the form :
key [sub f i  el di, subfieldm]
For example a message
a -> b : {c k , { ck ,a }kb} ka
would be represented as
[a, b, ka[ck, kb[ck, a]]]
It is important to understand the difference between variables and con­
stants. Each symbol represented in a protocol process state can be a variable 
or a constant. Variables occur in those places where the penetrator might 
cause variations. Constants occur in places where interfering with the sym­
bol’s value may cause the failure of the penetrator to achieve his goal. Changes 
in those places may cause such an abnormality that some principal may detect 
this and abort the connection and even inform other principals and abort the 
run of the protocol itself.
Apart from several communicating processes, we assume a separate buffer 
to hold messages in transit. Also it is assumed that the destination of any 
deliverable message can be determined from the content of the message. The 
global state of the network depends on the state of each of the communicating 
processes and the state of the network buffer. A send operation changes the 
state of the sending process and adds the sent message to the buffer. A receive 
operation changes the state of the receiving process and deletes the received 
message from the buffer. A penetrator action is any operation on the buffer 
which does not affect the state of any process. The penetrator can add a new 
message to the buffer, provided the buffer size bound is not exceeded and it 
can modify an existing message or delete an existing message in the buffer.
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Penetration Analysis and User Interface
The version of The Interrogator which was studied, dealt with penetrator 
action to learn private information which is transmitted as data items in proto­
col messages. Simply stated, the Interrogator accepts a protocol specification 
and a target data item and it outputs a message history showing how the 
penetrator could target that item.
A message history is a sequence of message events consistent with the 
protocol specification. A message event is a term indicating transmission or 
reception of a message:
[sent(rai), rcvd(mi), ...., sent(mn)]
Penetrator action can cause a sent message to disappear or be replaced by 
a different message. This will result in the sent and rcvd items not alternating 
with each other.
In the tool, vertical bars represent parties in the protocol and labeled arrows 
show the messages. Dashed lines show potential areas of interference by the 
penetrator. The figure shows an example of the following protocol, in which 
the penetrator interferes with message 1 and finally obtains the data item 
data1. This is a key distribution protocol in which kdc is a key distribution 
centre. It receives a request from party a to talk to party b and so generates a 
connection key ck and sends it to a and 6, encrypted in their private keys ka 
and kb, respectively.
a —>kdc : b
kdc —> a : a, ka[ck]
kdc —> b : b, kb[ck]
a —> b : ck[datal]
b -> a : ck[data2]
The user interface has two components: the preprocessor and the display
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a kde
Figure 4.1: Sample Message History with Penetrator Actions
interface. The preprocessor accepts a protocol specification in a predefined 
format as described below and converts it into transmit and receive clauses for 




a, b, x, kdc : address 
ka, kb, kx, ck, oldck : key 
d : data 
RELATIONS
a, kdc : secret_key(a, ka)
b, kdc : secret_key(b, kb) 
x, kdc : secret_key(x, kx)
KNOWNS
a, b, x, kx, oldck, kb[oldck, a] 
MESSAGES
(* request ck *) [a, kdc, b]
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(* generate ck *) [kdc, a, ka[ck, kb[ck]]] 
(* forward ck *) [a, b, kb [ck]]
(* send data *) [b, a, ck[d]]
The CONSTANTS section lists the symbolic constants with their types, 
used in the protocol. The KNOWNS section lists all the constants and relations 
known to the penetrator before the protocol run starts. It also contains any 
information that the penetrator might have gathered from previous runs such 
as encrypted subfields or encryption keys. The RELATIONS section is used to 
denote any relationships assumed to hold between pairs of constants implying 
that if one value is known then the other can be calculated or looked up. 
Prefixing a relation with a list of addresses limits the relations as private to 
those addresses. In the above example, secret-key denotes a secret key relation 
of a principal with the key distribution centre, kdc.
In the conversion phase, the preprocessor takes the parse tree produced 
earlier and creates a state machine representation, one per principal in the 
protocol. Each protocol message is broken up into send and receive clauses.
The Interrogator can basically be characterized declaratively as a relation 
p-knows. This relation is:
p_knows(x, H, q)
It means that the penetrator can learn the value of the data item x at the 
conclusion of message history H, which takes the network from its initial state 
to q. This relation and the other ones described below are meant to reflect 
their implementation in Prolog. The basic definition of p-knows is as follows:
p_knows(x, H, q) iff
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x is known initially
or (H =  H’sent(m) and sent(m):q’ —» q
and H’ : q0 —> q’ and p_gets(x, m, H’ , q ’ ))
(H =  H’e and e:q’ —> q and p_knows(x, H’ , q ’ )) 
or (H: q0 —> q’ and p.modifies(q’ , q, H) 
and p_knows(x, H, q’ ))
This means that there are three ways to deduce that the penetrator knows 
the item x by the time H reaches q: It can be known initially; it can be obtained 
from the last sent message; or it might have already have been known in the 
previous network state q\ This last case expands into two cases; one when the 
last state change was due to a message event and one when the change was 
due to a penetrator action.
The notation H  =  H'e means event e is appended to message history H 1. 
The notation e : q' —> q denotes a network state transition from q’ to q. 
sent(m) denotes the transmission of message m.
The penetrator is initially assumed to know public information like ad­
dresses of all parties in the network, and the private key of some subverted 
party or any other prespecified information. To extract a data item, for the 
penetrator, the following relation is used:
p_gets(x, m, H, q) iff 
x is a field of m
or (k[m’] is a field of m and p_knows(k, H, q) 
and p_gets(x, m ’ , H, q)
This relation specifies that the penetrator can read any field of a message, 
but if the field is an encrypted submessage, the penetrator can extract a sub­
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field from it only if the key encrypting that field is known. It is assumed that 
the context of the prior state and history is available for this purpose, as this 
is needed to support the recursive reference to pJknows, for the key.
Penetrator actions to modify the network buffer use the relation:
p_modifies(q’ , q, H)
It means that if m is a new message in the network buffer of the new state 
the penetrator knows each field of m in the prior state q' , reached by history 
H.
Additionally, several computational operations on behalf of the penetrator 
are modeled, which are required to find attacks.
The Prolog implementation is built around these relations, to find attacks 
in a protocol. A suitable user interface helps helps the user in the choice of 
protocols, the target data item and a chosen final state, if any. The normal 
and modified message histories obtained are then displayed on the program’s 
main window.
4.1.2 Automated Tool for GNY Logic
The aim of using modal logics like BAN and GNY for protocol analysis is their 
simplicity and effectiveness in analyzing protocols. The logics are systemati­
cally applied to protocols represented in a suitable idealized format as required 
by them This process can reveal missing assumptions or defects in the proto­
col. This would then warrant revising the protocol and/or the assumptions 
and reapplying the inference rules. This process of applying and reapplying 
inference rules of the logic is tedious and error-prone and has prompted many 
efforts to automate the reasoning process [12, 13].
GNY logic has more than forty inference rules and this increases the pos­
sibility of missing some necessary inferences. The large number of inference
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rules also makes the reasoning process more laborious and as the GNY logic 
operates at a more finer level than BAN logic, proofs of goals attained tend to 
be much longer. All these problems have prompted the development of a tool 
for automating GNY logic, which we shall now describe.
The objective of this tool is to determine whether one or more statements 
defining the goal of the protocol are derivable from the given set of assumptions 
or not. The tool, in fact generates all statements that are derivable for a given 
protocol. Thus using this tool we can observe the states of all principals after 
each step in the protocol and also the final states achieved by all principals. 
The tool uses a forward chaining strategy to apply the logic in which the 
inference rules are repeatedly applied to the set of statements which consist of 
the initial assumptions, idealized protocol statements and derived statements 
until no further statements are derivable.
Many of the inference rules of the logic are not suitable for forward chaining, 
for example the freshness rule FI [13]
P N  » ( V )
P £ t ( X , Y )
which states that the ‘freshness’ of a concatenated message can be derived 
from the ‘freshness’ of any of its concatenates. Since Y can be any formula, 
the above rule can be applied infinitely to derive the freshness of any formula 
containing X. Thus to automate the GNY logic analysis, the GNY postulate 
set was modified, i.e., some rules were modified, some inessential rules were 
deleted and some previously implicit rules were added.
Modification to the G N Y  postulates
In order to have finiteness of derivations, modifications to the postulate set 
were made. This entire set of modified rules is described in [13].
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Implementation of the Tool
The tool provides a facility to represent logical constructs in an implementation 
language. It takes an input specification describing the idealized protocol and 
initial assumptions and outputs a complete set of logical statements derivable 
from the specification and the assumptions. It also provides a feature to extract 
proofs of statements derived. Proofs provide a mechanism to verify the protocol 
goals attained and also determine the role played by the various assumptions 
and protocol messages in the goal attainment. The tool is implemented in 
Prolog.
Protocol Specification
The various constants occurring in formulae within messages are repre­
sented by one or more lowercase letters. If K â  is a session key for two princi­
pals A and B, it is written as a Prolog atom kab. The remaining functions like 
concatenation, encryption, functions etc, are represented as Prolog structures 
which closely resemble the standard structures in which they are typically rep­
resented. Extensions are specified using a construct ext(X, C) where C is the 
extension to a formula X. If there is no extension, C is specified as ni l .
The following tables illustrate the equivalent structures for formulae and 
statements used in GNY logic :
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Formula Structure
( X , Y ) [X, Y]
{ X } k encrypt(X, shared(K))
{ X ) k decrypt(X, shared(K))
{ X } +k encrypt(X, public(K))
{ X } - K decrypt(X, private(K))
H( X) h(X)
F ( X i , .....iXn) f(Xl, Xn)
*X star(X)
X - ^ C ext(X, C)
X ext(X, nil)
Statement Structure
P < X told(P, X)
P  3 X possesses(P, X)
P  \ ~ x conveyed(P} X)
p  N  U X ) believes(P, fresh(X))
P  £  4>{X) believes(P, recognizes(X))
P ^ Q  A  R believes(P, secret(Q, S, R))
P  Q believes(P, public(K, Q))
P \ b C believes(P, C)
P ^ Q ^ C believes(P, controls(C), C))
P  ̂  Q Q ^  * believes(P, honest(Q))
c u c 2 [Cl, C2]
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For example the idealized statement
A < *{N a, B , *jha&} '̂as ^  S |ee A *Ab B
is written as
told(a, ext(star(encrypt([na, b, star(kab)], kas), believes(s, secret(a, 
kab, b)))))
Derived Statements
In order to represent derivation information of statements obtained by ap­
plying inference rules, a Prolog predicate fact/3 which defines an inference 
step, is used. Its format is
fact(Index, Stat, reason(Premls, Rule))
Index is an integer argument used to index instances of f act/3. Stat is the 
actual derived statement and Premls is a list containing indices of premises 
used to derive Stat by applying the rule Rule, fact/3 is also used to de­
scribe idealized statements and assumptions to maintain consistency. Premls 
is empty if Stat is either an inference step or an assumption and then Rule is 
appropriately 'Step' or 'Assumption'.
Usage of the Tool
The idealized description of the protocol to be analyzed is converted into Prolog 
syntax using the conversion tables shown previously. The set of facts denoting 
the idealized protocol description and initial assumptions is loaded into the 
analyzer to derive all logical statements derivable. This is done as:
| ?- analyze(<spec-file>).
After this the facts so generated are available to be queried foi protocol
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goals attained. The predicate f a c t / 3  is used with a dummy index I and Rule 
as follows
| ?- fact(I, Stat, Rule).
where Stat is the desired goal. If the goal is indeed attained the analyzer 
outputs the index of the stored fact as I and Rule which contains the Premls 
and actual rule resulting in Stat being attained.
explain_proof is used to obtain proofs of derived statements :
| ?- explain_proof (Stat) .
where Stat is an already derived statement. The steps leading to the 
derived statement are then listed. Each step is either an assumption or a 
conclusion drawn from earlier steps. The line numbers of premises used in the 
derivation and the inference rule are also output to the right of each statement.
4.2 Need for Further Automation
The automated tool for GNY logic described in the previous section is useful 
but still is difficult to use for the new user. Since the tool is implemented 
in Prolog, all the logical constructs for formulae and statements are Prolog 
structures. The idealized description and initial assumptions are also repre­
sented using the Prolog predicate fact/3 which is used to typify inference 
steps within the analyzer.
These requirements impose a need for the user of the tool to have elemen­
tary knowledge about Prolog and its syntax. The version of Prolog in which 
the tool has been implemented (XSB Version 1.4.0) operates in an environment 
of its own. Thus basic Prolog startup commands have to be known.
The correspondence between the Prolog structures used in the syntax and 
standard structures used in protocol messages is not easily apparent. It is
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especially difficult for a new user of the tool who is totally unfamiliar with the 
Prolog environment, to try to convert the idealized protocol specification and 
assumptions to prolog syntax and input them to the tool, without the possi­
bility of errors. A critical point is that the protocol messages input to the tool 
have to be in idealized form as required for the application of GNY logic. This 
imposes an added task of transforming standard protocol messages to include 
not-originated-here markers (*’s) and extensions to message components. This 
is a sufficiently cumbersome process, not to be done manually as the equivalent 
of GNY parsing has to be done on messages to insert the markers. A similar 
but slightly simpler effort is needed to append extensions to messages.
Another aspect is that while using GNY logic for protocol analysis, the sets 
of beliefs attained by all the principals keep increasing in size and this increase 
is evident if the analysis is performed step by step. Due to the large number of 
inference rules in the logic and detailed process of applying them, the beliefs 
increase in length and number for each principal and it is difficult for a user 
to keep track of the beliefs of each principal, particularly if he wishes to step 
through the analysis of the protocol for each message. This aspect is also true 
for proofs of attained goals as proofs can become lengthy and unweildy.
The aim is to provide a graphical user interface to this tool and provide 
features that attempt to minimise the problems in using the automated GNY 
tool. Basically our system has two main objectives:
1. Computer aided learning tool for protocols
Many protocols are designed nowadays for authentication and key ex­
change purposes. These are described sometimes using standard nota­
tions or notations defined for the purpose. The goals of these protocols, 
the roles of various principals and the flow of messages between them is 
not readily discerned by reading the standard protocol description. Our
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Figure 4.2: Schematic Diagram of Yahalom Protocol
system is expected to provide a user-friendly environment for display­
ing protocol runs. As seen in literature [4], protocols are often described 
using schematic diagrams and this can greatly enhance their understand­
ing, particularly in relation to the above mentioned aspects in protocols. 
Such a diagram would show the principals as circular nodes and potential 
channels of communication between principals as arcs between them. A 
single run of the protocol would then be shown as a sequence of mes­
sages, each of which is shown to flow from the sender to the receiver 
using some distinguishable graphical techniques. Also, the message text 
could be displayed alongside the arc. It would be useful to single-step 
through the protocol and this could facilitate better understanding of 
the positions of various principals at each step in the protocol.
A schematic diagram of the Yahalom protocol [4] is shown to illustrate 
the standard form of diagrammatic representation, in literature.
2. Further Automation
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The system we describe could fulfill the need for a top layer interface to 
the automated GNY tool. Since our system would provide a syntax of 
its own for the input of the protocol specification, which is not required 
to be in the idealized form required by GNY logic, this is expected to 
alleviate the need to use Prolog structures and human reasoning to insert 
not — originated — here markers and extensions to messages. Also this 
syntax enforces some other conditions which are implicit in an idealized 
protocol specification.
On the other hand, the graphical user interface takes care of interaction 
with the GNY tool and provides an environment to show protocol ses­
sions and also displays the beliefs of all principals during the course of 
protocol execution and also finally. Also the ability to extract proofs of 
any derived statement graphically is expected to build on the automation 
provided by the GNY tool and enhance its usage and overcome some of 
its problems and thereby provide more ease and assistance in the analysis 
of many protocols.
4.3 Comparison with ‘The Interrogator’
We detail some of the comparisons of facilities provided by our proposed pro­
tocol analyzer and its user interface with those provided by the Interrogator.
1. More information has to be provided to the Interrogator compared to 
that for our tool. For example, the constants (data items), the precise 
relations between the protocol entities e.g. keys etc and information 
known to the penetrator have to be specified as input. This compares 
with our tool where we propose to take the concrete messages only along 
with initial assumptions.
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2. The Interrogator specifies only protocols that are parsed and translated 
into prolog syntax can be selected for use within the tool whereas in our 
tool we can select any protocol from the family of protocols handled by 
GNY logic, and those that can be specified in the syntax of the analyzer.
3. The Interrogator concentrates on a penetration objective, particularly 
accessing cleartext data items within a protocol. In our tool, due to the 
step-wise depiction and display of beliefs, many different conclusions can 
be drawn about the state of the principals as also the final states of all 
the principals.
4. The Interrogator displays the entire protocol run with the message se­
quence, but in our tool besides having this facility we propose to have 
a mode for step-wise display of protocols messages and beliefs. We also 
propose to display proofs of any derived belief at any stage in the proto­
col.
5. We believe that the diagrammatic representation that we propose, that 
is, the use of circular nodes for principals and messages displayed as arcs 
between them, aids the understanding of the protocol better than the 
user interface used by the Interrogator.
4.4 Conclusion
We have seen the need and advantages of automating the process of formal 
analysis of protocols and how the use of such automated tools can greatly 
assist in the process and finally be an aid in the design of optimal protocols. 




The Protocol Analyzer and the 
User Interface
As described in the previous chapter, the system we are proposing serves the 
purpose of a computer aided learning tool and a top-layer graphical user in­
terface for a tool that implements logical analysis of cryptographic protocols. 
In this chapter we will discuss the features of the proposed system and give an 
overview of its design.
5.1 The Protocol Analyzer
The user interface system which is proposed will hereinafter be referred as the 
Protocol Analyzer. As outlined in the previous chapter, it has two main goals:
1. A computer based educational tool for protocols
2. A front-end user interface for the automated GNY tool.
As a computer based educational tool, the Protocol Analyzer provides the 
following features:
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1. Display of the chosen protocol in the form of a schematic diagram.
2. Facility to show the running of the protocol using the block schematic 
representation.
3. Facility to show single stepping of the protocol, using the block schematic 
representation and other features outlined below.
As part of the objective of providing a top layer interface to the automated 
GNY tool, the following features are provided:
1. An independent language for specification of protocol messages.
2. A translator for translating messages specified in this language to ideal­
ized form in Prolog.
3. Facility to display beliefs or derived statements and initial assumptions, 
initially and during the execution of the protocol.
4. Facility to display proofs of beliefs obtained, during the execution of the 
protocol.
5. Facility to modify the initial assumptions and rerun the protocol, during 
a session of a protocol.
The representation of a protocol in the form of a schematic diagram is ex­
pected to enhance its understanding from that gained by merely going through 
its concrete specification. The single stepping feature provided is expected to 
provide further insight into the execution of protocols and the roles of various 
principals in it. This feature combined with the display of beliefs of principals 
and proofs of derived beliefs is provided as an easier interface to the automated 
GNY tool. The protocol specification language provided is expected to help 







Figure 5.1: The Function of the Protocol Analyzer
format in Prolog. The translator translates messages specified in the syntax 
of this language into the idealized form.
The function of the P ro to co l A n a lyzer  is shown diagrammatically, in the 
figure. The various inputs and outputs from the P ro to co l A n a lyzer , and the 
interface between it and the automated GNY tool are also shown. The features 
outlined above are described in further detail in the next section.
5.2 F eatu res
5.2.1 Syntax for Protocol Specification
As mentioned in previous chapters, one of the shortcomings in using the au­
tomated GNY tool directly is that it requires the protocol specification in the 
idealized form as required by GNY logic [5]. The specification is also required 
to be in Prolog syntax, using Prolog constructs which are defined. These were 
listed in the two tables in the previous chapter.
As far as specifying protocol messages is concerned, the Prolog structures 
defined for the automated GNY tool are made to resemble their concrete coun­
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terparts as closely as possible. Our effort has been to bridge this gap and make 
message components look similar to how they are described, in literature. It 
must be understood however, that structures for encrypted, decrypted and 
hashed function components and components involving groups of subscripted 
variables cannot be represented as they are in a textual form of input. This 
could be done if input is accepted in graphical form using a graphical text 
editor, but this feature is not currently implemented and could be a useful 
extension to the existing system.
The concrete protocol messages are specified in a single file whose name is 
supplied as an argument to the Protocol Analyzer main program. The syntax 
followed for specifying messages is given in the table below. The formulae 
listed in the table conform to the standard notation used to describe message 
components. For each formula is given the corresponding construct to be used 
for the Protocol Analyzer. These constructs are then used to form messages in 
the file to be given as input to it.
Formula Structure
(X,Y) [x .y ]
w * enc(sh ared (k )) {x }
{ A } * 1 d ec(sh ared (k )) {x}
{A }+ * p u b (p u b lic (k )) {x}
{A } - * p r i(p r iv a te (k )) {x }
H(X) h {x}
F (X i, X „  .... X n) f ( x l , x2, . . . ,  xn)
It is assumed that all information in the specification will be in lowercase.
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This is done to maintain uniformity as the GNY tool requires input to be 
in lowercase and outputs from the tool, i.e., beliefs and proofs obtained will 
conform in style with the input description, while using names of principals, 
keys etc.
Names of keys or other subscripted symbols are specified by appending the 
subscripts to the symbol names in lowercase. In a message line, a comma and a 
single space are assumed as delimiters between two different components. Each 
message is written on a single line starting with the number of the message 
followed by a ‘ ) ’ and a space. This is followed by the name of the sender of the 
message. Then the characters > ' are written. This is meant to resemble 
the arrow showing the flow of the message from the sender to the receiver in 
concrete protocol descriptions. After these characters the name of the receiver 
is written followed by a V . All the characters occurring after this delimiter will 
be treated as message text by the text parser and translator. The text may 
contain names of principals involved in the protocol and other components 
conforming to the syntax given in the table, previously. Keys occurring within 
the message text need to be declared as shared, private, or public depending 
on the cryptosystem used.
Comments in protocol specification files are specified by placing a 4% ’ char­
acter in the first column of the line. When all messages are built in the manner 
indicated above, the file can be given as input to the Protocol Analyzer.
We give an example of the Otway-Rees protocol [2] to show how it can be 
represented in the syntax described above.
Otway-Rees Protocol
1. A -> B : M, A, B, {Na, M , A , B } Kat
2. B —> S : M, A, B, {Na, M , A , B } Kai, {Nb, M , A , B } Kbt
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3. S —> B : M, {Na, K ab} Kat, {N b, K ab} Kbt
4. B —> A : M, {N a,A'ab} Kat
This description is translated using the table given as:
1) a -> b
2) b -> s
3) s -> b
4) b -> a
m, a, b, enc(shared(kas)){ [na, m, a, b]} 
m, a, b, enc(shared(kas)){[na, m, a, b]}, 
enc(shared(kbs)){[nb, m, a, b]} 




A limitation of the syntax described above is that protocol messages con­
sisting of nested components i.e. encryption within encryption, hashing within 
hashing and so on cannot be specified in the syntax. Hence protocols consist­
ing of such messages cannot be analyzed using the Protocol Analyzer, in the 
current implementation. This is due to constraints on implementation of the 
text translator and can be a good enhancement to the system in future.
Some other limitations of the Protocol Analyzer and associated further work 
are discussed at length in the concluding chapter.
Initial Assumptions
All the principals in the protocol are assumed to have a set of initial beliefs 
before the start of the protocol, in the application of GNY logic. This initial 
set of beliefs and assumptions are also required to be input in the form of a
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text file to the Protocol Analyzer. The Protocol Analyzer will later use this as 
input to the automated GNY tool, when it is invoked.
The syntax used for specifying initial assumptions is the same as that used 
for input to the GNY tool. This is done to avoid complexity in implementation. 
The assumptions are specified using the Prolog predicate fa c t /3 . The index 
of facts, i.e., the first argument to the predicate must begin from one after the 
number of messages listed in the protocol specification file. When the initial 
assumptions of all principals are listed, a predicate f la g  is used to declare the 
index of the last fact instance to the GNY tool. The file containing the initial 
assumptions can then be supplied as input to the Protocol Analyzer.
5.2.2 Messages Translator
The main task of the messages translator is to transform the protocol messages 
from the syntax defined for the user to the idealized form required by GNY 
logic. All the messages are translated into idealized form and stored internally. 
The idealized messages and initial assumptions are later used by the Proto­
col Analyzer as input to the GNY tool. The actual design of the messages 
translator will be discussed in later sections.
5.2.3 Diagrammatic Representation of Protocols
As described previously, the form of representation used for schematic display 
of protocols in the Protocol Analyzer is similar to that used in literature [4, 13]. 
We start by describing the look and feel of the graphical user interface.
The Protocol Analyzer has a main window which consists the schematic 
diagram of the principals of the protocol and other control panes. The control 
panes are four mouse-sensitive areas or buttons which occur in the top of the 
window. These buttons are Go, Run, Re-edit and Quit. The functions of these
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buttons are described below:
G O  : This button is used to activate the single-step mode of the Protocol 
Analyzer. This is also the mode in which the it interacts with the GNY tool 
and displays the beliefs in each principal’s subwindow after each step. The 
single-step mode is explained in detail later.
R U N  : This button is used to activate the full run of the protocol. On ac­
tivating this button, the full sequence of messages is run through by showing 
the flow from sender to receiver for each message. The full-run mode is also 
explained later.
R E -E D IT  : This button is used to activate a text editor from within the Pro­
tocol Analyzer to edit the initial assumptions of the protocol principals. After 
the changes are made and the Go button is activated the single stepping of 
the protocol begins again. The Re-edit feature is explained in a later section, 
in detail.
Q U IT  : The quit button is used to exit the Protocol Analyzer.
In the schematic diagram, all the principals in the protocol are shown as 
circular objects. These circular objects are connected by arcs, representing 
communication channels between the principals. A circular object contains 




The lowermost portion of the main window displays a status line. This is 
a single line of text which is drawn in reverse-video with a default message 
displayed within it. The status line is used to display diagnostic messages 
during the various modes and when quitting the Protocol Analyzer. This is 
especially useful when single-stepping through the protocol with beliefs being 
displayed, as the status line displays the mode and current message number 
being stepped through.
5.2.4 Modes of the P ro to co l A n a lyzer
The Protocol Analyzer, initially is in a default wait state, waiting for input 
from the user. The user can enter one of the two modes: Full-Run mode or 
Single-Step mode for viewing the execution of the protocol. The details of 
these modes are described here.
Full-Run mode
In this mode, the full execution of the protocol is shown. Once the Protocol 
Analyzer is invoked from the command line, the main window comes up, and 
the schematic diagram of the protocol specified on the command line is drawn 
on it. The system then enters a normal wait mode, waiting for input from the 
user.
As explained before, the user may invoke the full-run mode of the protocol 
by clicking the mouse on the Run button. On clicking this button, the first 
message of the protocol is displayed along the arc joining the sender and the 
receiver principals of the message. The message text is displayed in the syntax 
defined for the protocol input specification. The actual flow of the message is 
shown when the arc is highlighted by a thick line in reverse-video, terminated
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by an arrow to show the direction of the message from the sender to the 
receiver. The status line is updated to reflect step 1. After a brief delay, the 
next message transition is displayed in the same manner.
The process outlined above is repeated for all messages in the protocol. 
After the last message is displayed the main window and the protocol schematic 
diagram are redrawn as they were initially and the system returns to its wait 
state.
5.2.5 Single-Step Mode
From the normal wait state of the Protocol Analyzer, the single stepping mode 
can be activated by clicking the Go button.
In the single-step mode, as opposed to the Full-run mode, the user can 
intervene after each protocol step is over.
The main window contains a number of subwindows 1 for displaying beliefs. 
There is a beliefs subwindow for each principal in the protocol which will 
be used to show its beliefs as the protocol progresses. Initially each belief 
subwindow displays the initial assumptions.
When the user clicks on the Go button, the single-step mode is activated. In 
this mode, each message exchange is shown in the same way as in the full-run 
mode. In addition, beliefs of the sender and the receiver are also updated. The 
Protocol Analyzer appropriately interacts with the GNY tool for this purpose. 
To see the next message transition and the next set of beliefs the user has to 
click on the Go button again and the same process repeats. This can be done 
for all the messages in the protocol. No other option except Quit and Re-edit 
can be selected until all the messages are stepped through.
1 These are actually windows which are children of the root display window in Xlib. We 
refer to them as subwindows in order to differentiate from the main window.
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5.2.6 Displaying Beliefs
In the graphical user interface of the Protocol analyzer, a subwindow is created 
for displaying the beliefs for each principal. Initially in the Protocol Analyzer's 
wait state, these subwindows display the initial assumptions.
The beliefs subwindows are scrollable, meaning that if the number of beliefs 
exceed the number of rows that can be displayed entirely in a subwindow the 
user can view the undisplayed beliefs by scrolling forward on the scrollbar. A 
mouse-sensitive scrollbar is present in the left of every beliefs or proofs subwin­
dow. Text can be scrolled forwards and backwards. The beliefs text pane is 
also mouse sensitive and when the user clicks on any belief a proofs subwindow 
comes up which displays the proof leading to that derived statement.
Within the subwindow, the beliefs are wrapped, meaning beliefs longer 
than the length of the subwindow are continued to the next line. Each be­
lief subwindow displays a title showing which principal’s beliefs it is actually 
displaying.
5.2.7 Proofs
Proofs provide a means to verify the attainment of a derived statement during 
the course of the protocol run or after it is over. The Protocol Analyzer provides 
a facility to display proofs of attained beliefs within the graphical user interface.
In the single-step mode, the user can view the proof of any derived be­
lief which is currently displayed in a beliefs subwindow. When the mouse is 
positioned over the belief for which the proof is required and clicked, a proof 
subwindow similar to the beliefs subwindow comes up and it displays the set 
of statements leading to the belief. The proof is displayed exactly as obtained 
from the GNY tool, in the same syntax. A single proof subwindow is shown
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in the figure. The proof subwindow is also scrollable forwards and backwards 
and proofs are continued on following lines within the subwindow.
5.2.8 Re-edit Facility
In the main window, the Re-edit button activates a text editor to edit the 
initial assumptions.
When the user is running the protocol in single-step mode, he may at any 
time click on the Re-edit button. This will cause spawning of a text editor 
with a copy of the initial assumptions file loaded for editing. The actual editor 
spawned depends on the value of the environment variable E D IT O R , which 
is expected to be set. If this variable is not set, the default editor vi is used. 
When the user completes the changes to the initial assumptions, he can save the 
file and quit the editor. The window with the text editor will then disappear 
and a new set of belief subwindows will be displayed. A beliefs subwindow 
will be created for each principal and the modified initial assumptions will be 
displayed on it. The previous set of belief subwindows are left as they are.
From this point on, the user can click on Go, and single-step through the 
protocol with the new set of initial assumptions. When the single-stepping 
reaches the same step, at which the re-editing was activated, the new beliefs 
subwindow would display a set of beliefs which would possibly be different from 
the previous set. This would enable a comparison between the previous set 
and the new set of beliefs and can be used to study the effect of modification 
of initial assumptions on the statements derived at the end of that step and 
other steps and also at the end of the protocol session.
It is important to note that the re-editing process can be performed only 
once and further changes to the initial assumptions can only be made from 
outside the Protocol Analyzer environment and the it must be run again with
77
Figure 5.2: Protocol Analyzer - Block Schematic Diagram 
the modified assumptions file, from the command line.
5.3 P ro g ra m  C o m p on en ts and D e sig n
Figure 5.2 is a block diagram of the P rotoco l A nalyzer. The portion of the 
diagram enclosed in dashed lines shows the implementation of the computer 
aided learning tool and the user interface for the automated GNY tool.




2. Text Input and Translation
3. GNY tool interaction
4. Display
5.3.1 Control
Control is the main controlling module of the system. It interacts with the 
text input modules to transform the protocol messages into idealized form. It 
is also responsible for creating and maintaining the windows and subwindows 
of the Protocol Analyzer. It also interacts with the GNY modules to obtain 
principals’ beliefs at each step of the protocol and controls all these operations 
whilst waiting for input on the Protocol Analyzer main window.
The control module due to the nature of its tasks is not built as a class. 
The detailed source code appears in Appendix A.
5.3.2 Text Input and Translation
The text input and translation module performs text input and translation to 
the idealized form required by GNY logic. The concrete protocol messages and 
initial assumptions are read from input files and the messages are translated 
into idealized form for subsequent input to the GNY tool.
5.3.3 G N Y Tool Interaction
This module interacts with the automated GNY tool during protocol analysis. 
It provides the idealized messages and principals’ beliefs to the GNY tool and
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the GNY tool returns the modified set of beliefs derivable as a result of the 
idealized messages provided to it.
In a similar manner, this module provides a belief statement together with 
a set of initial assumptions and an idealized protocol to the GNY tool, and it 
returns a proof of that belief (if it is provable).
5.3.4 Display
The Display module performs all the graphical user interface operations like 
drawing various components, drawing the protocol schematic diagram, display 
of beliefs and proofs in subwindows and handling graphical attributes, like 
scrolling text and handling mouse clicks on these windows.
5.3.5 Flow of Information
In the Protocol Analyzer, figure 5.2, we can observe how information flows from 
input to output.
The Protocol Analyzer accepts the initial assumptions and concrete protocol 
messages of the protocol as input. These are supplied to the Text Input and 
Translation module. This module validates the input specified in the language 
of the Protocol Analyzer and translates it into the idealized form as required 
by the automated GNY tool.
The initial assumptions and idealized messages are sent to the GNY Tool 
Interaction module by the Control Module. The Control module also supplies 
the initial assumptions and the concrete protocol messages to the Display 
module for display on the program’s windows. The GNY Tool Interaction 
module provides the current set of beliefs (which are the initial assumptions at 
the start of the protocol) and the idealized messages to the automated GNY 
tool, which returns the updated set of beliefs for all principals in the protocol.
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This is then sent by the GNY Tool Interaction module to the Control module 
which displays them by providing them to the Display module.
The Control phase coordinates this flow of information at all times.
The entire coding for the system is done using SC3.0.1 C + +  [30] and 
X11R5/Xlib [14, 15] for graphical support. The modules associated with the 
above tasks are organized into classes except for Control Instanced objects of 
these classes are used in the implementation. All the header and source files 
for all modules4 appear in Appendix A.
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Chapter 6
Results of Protocol Analysis
The main features of the Protocol Analyzer were described in the previous 
chapter along with an overview of its design. Examples of application of the 
Protocol Analyzer in the analysis of authentication and key-exchange protocols 
are included in this chapter.
6.1 Analysis of known Protocols
The Protocol Analyzer is used to examine three well known protocols:
1. Voting Protocol
2. Otway-Rees Protocol
For each protocol, the input protocol specification is written according to 
the syntax described in chapter 5. This specification together with the initial 
assumptions are then used as input to the Protocol Analyzer. For each protocol, 
beliefs of each principal were displayed after every step.
Proofs of certain beliefs, displayed by the Protocol Analyzer, were exam­
ined and the effect of changing initial assumptions on principals’ beliefs were 
studied.
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In the remaining sections of this chapter, the highlights of these results are 
presented for the Voting and Otway-Rees protocols.
6.2 Voting Protocol
The Voting Protocol is described in literature [4, 5]:
1. Q - * P, : Ng
2. Pi - -*Q-.Pi, Nh Vi, H(Nq,<  Si > , Vi)
3. Q - > P i : R , H ( N i , < S i > , R )
where Pt- is a participant in the voting and Q is the coordinator. V{ is the 
actual vote sent by Pi to Q and R is the result announced by Q. Nq and 
N{ are nonces generated by Q and Pi respectively and H()  is a one-way hash 
function.
This protocol specification in the syntax of the Protocol Analyzer is:
1) q -> pi : nq
2) pi -> q : pi, ni, vi, h{[nq, s i ,  v i ] }
3) q -> pi : r, h{[ni,  s i ,  r ] }
The above protocol specification is written using the syntax described in 
section 5.2.1. The keywords that can be used in the syntax are given in table 
1 in section 5.2.1.
The initial assumptions for principals Pi and Q are described in Prolog 
syntax as:
fact(4, possesses(pi, si), reason([], 'Assumption*)). 
fact(5, possesses(pi, ni), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(6, believes(pi, secret(q, si, pi)), reason([], 'Assumption')).
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fact(8 ,  possesses(q, s i ) ,  reason([], 'Assumption')).
fact(9 ,  possesses(q, nq), reason([], ' Assumption') ) .
fa c t (10, believes(q, secret(q, s i ,  p i ) ) ,  reason( [ ] ,  'Assumption')).
fa c t (11, believes(q, fresh(nq)), reason([], 'Assumption')).
flag(count, 11).
These initial assumptions are written as facts  in idealized form. These 
are directly loaded into the automated GNY tool facts database. Each fact 
specified above is written using the syntax described in section 4.1.2. Each 
fact above describes a belief held by a principal before the start of the protocol 
using keywords given in tables 1 and 2 in section 4.1.2. For initial assumptions 
as above, the reason specified is always Assumption. The keyword count used 
in the last fa ct  above is a keyword to denote that the number following it is 
the number of facts specified in the initial assumptions.
6.2.1 Results
On providing the Protocol Analyzer with the above input, a schematic diagram 
of the Voting Protocol is displayed. This is shown in the figure 1 in the 
appendix to this chapter.
In this state, the full-run mode is invoked in which case, every step of the 
protocol is shown by an arrow from the sender to the receiver accompanied by 
the message text. The beliefs subwindows are not updated in this mode. This 
mode gives us a quick understanding of how messages are actually transmitted 
in the Voting protocol.
A beliefs subwindow for principal q is shown in figure 10 in the appendix, 
under section B.1.2. It lists the beliefs attained by q after step 2 in the protocol.
By clicking on the belief 2, we obtain a proof for it in a separate proofs 
subwindow which is figure 3 in the appendix.
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In this case we wish to see how the belief t o ld (q ,  p i )  was derived. The 
proofs subwindow shows 2 steps for this belief. In the first step, q attains the 
belief:
told(q, [pi, ni, vi ,  ext(star(h([nq, s i ,  v i ] ) ) ,  possesses(pi, s i ) ,  
possesses(pi, n i ) , believes(pi, secret(q, s i ,  p i ) ) ) ] )
because of the protocol step 2. Note that the above is the idealized form of 
step 2.
As a result of this step and Being-told rule 2, the belief t o ld (q ,  pi )  is 
derived.
Modification of initial assumptions
After stepping through the Voting protocol, we would like to study the 
effect of changing initial assumptions on the final beliefs attained by pi and q.
We delete assumptions corresponding to facts with numbers 4 and 6, shown 
above. These mean that pi no longer possesses si and it does not believe that 
si is a secret between itself and g, before the start of the protocol.
When the protocol is re-run and the final beliefs attained by pi and q are 
displayed, we observe that, principal q has attained new beliefs all implying 
that nq, si and vi are conveyed. This means that q believes that nq, si and vi 
were told to it by pi but not necessarily in the current run. On the other hand 
pi believes that nq, si and vi when it conveyed them.
Thus it is seen that some different conclusions have been reached by q as a 
result of modifying the initial assumptions of pi. The goal of the protocol was 
that q believes that nq, si and vi were told to it by pi in the current run, which 
could be attained with the original set of assumptions. With the modified set, 
the beliefs representing the goal of the protocol cannot be attained.
On the other hand, if we only suppress fact 6 and re-run the analysis, the 
above belief is still attained implying that the initial belief represented in fact
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6 is redundant. Repeating similar experiments for other assumptions, we can 
conclude that some of the assumptions in the original set are redundant.
Thus the above experiment shows that the Protocol Analyzer is able to 
assist in the protocol analysis process by identifying important initial assump­
tions and the effect of changing them on the final outcome of the protocol.
The windows showing g’s final beliefs before and after the change in as­
sumptions are given in figures in Appendix B, section 3.
Other detailed results obtained for the analysis of Voting protocol are given 
in Appendix B.
6.3 Otway-Rees Protocol
The protocol description for Otway-Rees protocol is:
1. A - > B - . M , A , B , { N a, M , A , B } Kai
2. B ^  S : M, A,B,  {Na, M, A, B } Kai, {Nb, M, A, B j Kbi
3. S ^ B : M ,  {Na, K ai} K" , { N b, I<ab} Kbs
4. B ^ A : M , { N a, K ab} Kat
where A and B  are the two principals, K as and K is are their private keys and 
S is the authentication server. The principals A and B  generate the nonces 
iV0, Nb and M, and the server S generates K ab which becomes the session key 
between A and B.
This description is expressed in the syntax of the Protocol Analyzer:
1) a -> b : m, a, b, enc(shared(kas)) { [na, m, a, b]}
2) b -> s : m, a, b, enc (shared (kas) ){[na, m, a, b]} ,  
enc (shared (kbs) ) {  [nb, m, a , b] }
3) s -> b : m, enc (shared (kas) ) { [na, shared (kab)] } ,
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enc(shared(kbs)) { [nb, shared (kab)]}
4) b -> a : m, enc(shared(kas)){[na, shared(kab)]}
As mentioned in the previous section, the above statements are written 
with the rules given in table 1 in section 5.2.1.
The initial assumptions of principals u, b and s are:
f a c t (5, possesses(a, shared(kas)) ,  reason([ ] , ' Assumption') ) .  
f a c t (6, believes(a, secret(a, kas, s ) ) ,  reason([ ] , ' Assumption) ) .  
f a c t(7, possesses(a, na), reason( [ ] , 'Assumption') ) .  
f a c t (8, believes(a, recognizes(na)), reason([], *Assumption') ) .  
f a c t (9, believes(a, fresh(na)), reason([], ; Assumption) ) .  
f a c t (10, believes(a, honest(s)), reason([], ' Assumption; ) ) .  
f a c t ( l l ,  believes(a, controls(s, secret(a, K, b ) ) ) ,  reason([],
; Assumption; ) ) .
fact(12, possesses(a, m), reason([], ; Assumption)) . 
fact(13, believes(a, fresh(m)), reason([], ; Assumption; ) ) .
f a c t (14, possesses(b, shared(kbs)) ,  reason([ ] , ’ Assumption') ) .  
fact(15, believes(b, secret(b, kbs, s ) ) ,  reason([ ] , 3Assumption') ) .  
f a c t (16, possesses(b, nb), reason([ ] , ;Assumption') ) .  
f a c t (17, believes(b, recognizes(nb)) ,  reason([], ’ Assumption') ) .  
f a c t (18, believes(b, fresh(nb)), reason([], ' Assumption’ ) ) .  
fact(19, believes(b, honest(s)), reason([], ’ Assumption’ ) ) .  
fact(20, believes(b, controls(s, secret(a, K, b ) ) ) ,  reason([],
’ Assumption’ ) ) .
f a c t (21, possesses(s, shared(kas)) ,  reason( [ ] , ’ Assumption’ ) ) .
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fact(22, believes(s, secret(a, kas, s ) ) ,  reason( [ ] , 'Assumption')) 
f a c t (23, possesses(s, shared(kbs)) ,  reason([ ] , ' Assumption') ) .  
fact (24, believes ( s , secret(b, kbs, s ) ) ,  reason( [ ] , 'Assumption')) 
fa c t (25, possesses(s, shared(kab)) ,  reason([ ] , ' Assumption') ) .  
fa c t (26, believes(s, secret(a, kab, b )) ,  reason([ ] , ' Assumption'))
flag(count, 26).
These assumptions are written according to the syntax given in section 
4.1.2.
When the Protocol Analyzer is provided with the above description and 
initial assumptions, it displays the schematic diagram for Otway-Rees protocol 
as shown in appendix B, section 3
When the full-run mode is invoked, the sequence of messages transmitted 
during the protocol are displayed in the schematic diagram.
Beliefs subwindows are displayed for each principal along with the main 
window displaying the schematic diagram. Figure 14 in appendix B shows a 
beliefs subwindow for principal 5, listing the beliefs of s after step 2 of the 
protocol.
Modification of initial assumptions
In the case of Otway-Rees protocol, we show the effect of change of initial 
assumptions on the final beliefs of a, 6 and s.
Stepping through the Otway-Rees protocol to completion shows that since a 
believes in the freshness and possession of m, other conclusions m like believing 
in the freshness of message components containing m, follow.
Now the initial assumptions are changed and the initial beliefs of a, in 
freshness of m are deleted. It is observed that a does not believe in the freshness 
of any message components containing m, anymore.
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The goal of the protocol is that a believes in the freshness of m and freshness 
of message components containing to. We can see from the above experiment 
that removal of initial beliefs of a in the freshness of m results in the goal not 
being attained.
The beliefs of a before and after the modification of the initial assumptions 
are shown in figures in appendix B, section 3. The above experiment also aids 
in understanding the role of particular initial assumptions in the final outcome 
of the protocol and the effect of their absence from the initial assumptions 
provided to the protocol analyzer.
With experiments performed on Voting and Otway-Rees protocols, we can 





The main task in the project was to develop a tool serving two main objectives: 
a computer aided learning tool for showing executions of protocols and a front­
end user interface for the automated GNY logic tool. This has been done and 
the system is tested for some known protocols.
In this chapter, possible extensions and enhancements to this system are 
discussed.
7.1 Extensions
During and after the process of development of the Protocol Analyzer, several 
useful extensions were thought of and these are described in this section. It is 
believed that these extensions could increase the usefulness of the system and 
also its applicability.
7.1.1 Full Protocol Simulation
The development of an automated learning tool for protocols followed in the 
Protocol Analyzer is modeled on the Interrogator [7]. The Protocol Analyzer
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provides a display of the chosen protocol in the Full-Run mode. This is ex­
pected to help in the understanding of the working of the protocol. The ap­
proach followed has also concentrated on providing an interface to the auto­
mated GNY tool for a full formal analysis of the protocol. This is similar to 
the scheme used in the Interrogator, where a penetration attack by an intruder 
to obtain the value of a message data item, is found and displayed.
An alternative approach could have been followed in the development of 
the Protocol Analyzer. The emphasis could have been on an informal analysis 
of the protocol at the top level using the display features available and the 
schematic diagram. The following features would prove valuable in such an 
approach:
1. Provision of control and display of protocol messages as bit strings. This 
would enable the user to understand the role of every portion of the 
message in the bit string. This would prove useful as in an environment 
controlled by an intruder or if the channels between the principles were 
insecure, the attack would probably take place using the characteristics 
of bit strings of messages.
2. As an extension of the above concept, run-time values could be provided 
to protocol message components. This could include supplying user spec­
ified values to variable symbols, timestamps and nonces. A timestamp 
generation facility could also be included.
3. As far as encrypted or hashed function components of messages are con­
cerned, a choice could be provided to the user at the message level to 
choose encryption or hash functions or even secret or public keys. A 
good method would be to display a menu of encryption or hash func­
tions already implemented, to be used for a particular component in a
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message.
The effect on the final outcome of the protocol as a result of choices made 
on the user’s part could be observed in relation to any new vulnerability to 
attacks, introduced as a result. The above features could also aid in further 
understanding of the protocol working.
These features could be implemented within the current system itself, using 
the set of graphical user interface classes. These classes could be suitably 
modified to provide additional functionality and if required additional classes 
could be written for specific purposes.
7.2 Other Extensions
In relation to the current implementation of the Protocol Analyzer, several 
features could be incorporated considering existing shortcomings in it. These 
features are described below:
1. Although the text input and translation phase can handle 5 principals in 
the protocol, the display portion can display at most 3 principals. This 
limitation is because of implementation constraints and the potential 
complications that would result in the display portion. It would be a good 
extension to be able to provide for displaying protocols with more than 3 
principals. A suitable display strategy for such protocols would also need 
to be worked out. Most of the changes would be in the Control module 
as it is the module which builds the display with fixed components and 
maintains it.
2. The syntax specified for protocol specification in the Protocol Analyzer 
cannot handle protocols with nested encryption or hashed components in
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messages. A suitable extension would be to provide the nesting feature 
enabling a larger number of protocols to be analyzed by the analyzer. 
The level of nesting would obviously have to be limited to a number 
and this number explicitly specified. This feature could be provided 
by making changes in the class Text Input to both data members and 
member functions as needed.
3. The beliefs obtained and proofs of such derived beliefs, obtained by ap­
plication of GNY logic are currently displayed as they are, in the same 
Prolog syntax. It would be a good enhancement to display beliefs and 
proofs in PostScript. A feature available with the automated GNY tool is 
to translate Prolog syntactic statements to Latex [26] format. The state­
ments in Latex can then be converted to PostScript format using tools 
available in Unix like la tex  and dvips. This PostScript information 
can then be displayed using ghostview. The statements in PostScript 
appear in the standard syntax used for logics like BAN and GNY [4, 5]. 
This would facilitate better understanding of the positions of various 
principals.
4. It would be an ideal extension to provide a choice of protocols to analyze 
from within the Protocol Analyzer. A window pane listing protocols 
with their corresponding specification and initial assumptions’ files, could 
be provided for the user to choose from. This would enable run-time 
changing of the protocol without exiting the system and rerunning it. 
This feature could be implemented using the existing classes.
5. The re-editing process for initial assumptions can be done only once. 
One enhancement could be to increase the scope of re-editing to provide 
more than one change, but obviously limited to some number. Another
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related feature could be to provide a facility to go back to the original 
set of assumptions, discarding changes to the initial assumptions. An 
option could also be included to allow the user to specify a particular 
version of the assumptions, to go back to, in the case when more than 
one change in the assumptions is allowed.
The Protocol Analyzer in its current implementation nevertheless provides 
a good environment to observe the working of protocols and perform belief 
based analysis on them. It is expected to serve the needs of protocol designers 
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The Protocol Analyzer Source 
Code
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
/ /  File : Arc.h
/ /
/ /  ,
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
u  . . . . .
/ /  Description : This file contains the global declarations 
/ /  and class specification for class Arc.
/ /
/ /
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
# ifn d e f JDISPLAYBASE_
#include ’’DisplayBase .h”
#endif






class Arc : public DisplayBase
{
public:
Arc(Display ^display, Window parent_win, GC gc,
int pos_x_l, int pos_y_l, int pos_x_2, int pos_y_2);
void DrawArc() const;
void HighlightArc(arrowDir thearrowDir) const; 
void UnHighlightArc(arrowDir thearrowDir) const; 
Bool Pointer_in_area() const;
private:







/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
/ /  File : Arc.C
/ /
/ /
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
/ /
/ /  Description : This file contains member and other 
/ /  functions related to Class Arc.
/ /
/ /
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
#include ’’Arc.h”
Arc::Arc(Display ^display, Window parent.win, GC gc,
int pos_x_l, int pos_y_l, int pos_x_2, int pos_y_2)
{
fdisplay =  display;
fcurrent .window =  parent.win;
fgc =  gc;
fpos_x_l =  pos_x_l; 
fpos_y_l =  pos_y_l; 
fpos_x_2 =  pos_x_2; 
fpos_y_2 =  pos_y_2;
/ /  Determine and store the slope of the arc
feqn.slope =  (fpos_yJ2 - fpos_y_l)/(fposjx;_2 - fpos_x_l);





/ / G o  ahead and draw the arc(line)





Arc::HighlightArc(arrowDir thearrowDir =  right) const
{
unsigned int line.width;
/ /  Change line width to 5 for drawing
100
line_width =  5;
XSetLineAttributes(fdisplay, fgc, line_width, LineSolid,
CapButt, JoinMiter);
XDrawLine(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, fgc, fpos_x_l, fpos_y_l, 
fpos_x_2, fpos_y_2);
Draw Arrow(thearrowDir) ;
/ /  Reset the line width 
line_width =  1;










if (fpos_y_l <  fpos_y_2)
{
XDrawLine(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, fgc, fpos_x_2, 
fpos_y_2, fpos_x_2, fpos_y_2 - 30); 
XDrawLine(fdisplay, fcurrent.window, fgc, fpos_x_2, 
fpos_y_2, fpos_x_2 +  40, fpos_y_2 - 15);
}
else
if (fpos_y_l >  fpos_y_2)
{
XDrawLine(fdisplay, fcurrent.window, fgc, fpos_x_2, 
fpos_y_2, fpos_x_2, fpos_y_2 +  30); 
XDrawLine(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, fgc, fpos_x_2, 




XDrawLine(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, fgc, fpos_x_2,
fpos_y_2, fpos_x_2 - 20, fpos_y_2 - 15); 
XDrawLine(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, fgc, fpos_x_2, 




if (fpos_y_l <  fpos_y_2)
{
XDrawLine(fdisplay, fcurrent.window, fgc, fpos_x_l, 
fpos_y_l, fpos-x_l, fpos_y_l -f 30); 
XDrawLine(fdisplay, fcurrent.window, fgc, fpos_x_l, 
fpos_y_l, fpos_x_l - 40, fpos_y_l +  15);
}
else
if (fpos_y_l >  fpos_y_2)




fpos_y_l, fpos_x_l - 40, fpos.y.l - 15); 
XDrawLine(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, fgc, fpos_x_l, 
fpos_y_l, fpos_x_l, fpos_y_l - 30);
else
{
XDrawLine(fdisplay, fcur rent .window, fgc, fpos_x_l, 
fpos.y.l, fpos_x_l +  20, fpos.y.l - 15); 
XDrawLine(fdisplay, fcurrent.window, fgc, fpos_x_l, 






Arc::UnHighlightArc(arrowDir thearrowDir =  right) const
{  . . . .unsigned int line.width;
line.width =  5;
XSetLineAttributes(fdisplay, fgc, line.width, LineSolid,
CapButt, JoinMiter);
XSetFunction(fdisplay, fgc, GXclear);
XDrawLine(fdisplay, fcurrent.window, fgc, fpos_x_l, fpos.y.l, 
fpos_x_2, fpos_y_2);
/ /  Unhighlight the arrow 
DrawArrow(thearrowDir) ;
XSetFunction(fdisplay, fgc, GXcopy);
line.width =  1;
XSetLineAttributes(fdisplay, fgc, line.width, LineSolid,
CapButt, JoinMiter);






{ . . .
Window root.win, child.win;
int root_x, root.y, win_x, win.y; 
unsigned int mask;
/ /  Determine x and y position of mouse pointer
if (XQueryPointer(fdisplay, fcurrent.window, &root_win, &child_win, 
&root_x, &root_y, &win_x, fcwin.y, ¿¿mask))
if ((win.y >  (feqn.slope * win_x +  feqn.c)) kk





/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
/ /  File : Beliefs Window.h
/ /
/ /  _
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
n . . . .
/ /  Description : This file contains the global declarations 
/ /  and class specification for class 
/ /  BeliefsWindow.
/ /
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
# ifn d e f _DISPLAYBASE_
#include ’’DisplayBase .h”
#endif
# ifn d ef _SCROLLBAR_
#include ’’ScrollBar .h”
#endif
#include < c ty p e .h >
#define DELTA-X 10
#def ine NUM_BELIEF_LINES 200
#def ine NUM -PROOFXINES 100
/ /  Typedef for structure storing beliefs 
ty p ed ef struct 
{
char *beliefs[NUM_BELIEF_LINES]; 
unsigned short wraps[NUM_BELIEF_LINES]; 
int num_beliefs;
} beliefs-text;
class BeliefsWindow : public DisplayBase
{
public:
BeliefsWindow(Display ^display, Window parent.win, int marge, 
char *margv[), GC gc, 
char *windowname, int left_x, int left_y, 
unsigned int width, unsigned int height, 
unsigned int border.width, unsigned long border, 
unsigned long background, char *fontname); 
~BeliefsWindow();
Window Window_id() { return fcurrent_window; };
void Init_y_offset() { fy.dist =  INCREMENT.Y; };
void Drawltself();
void LoadBeliefs(char *text);









unsigned int fwidth; 
unsigned int fheight; 
unsigned int fborder.width; 
unsigned long fborder; 
unsigned long fbackground; 




unsigned short top-display Jndex; 
unsigned short bottom-display Jndex; 
ScrollBar *sbar;
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
/ /  File : BeliefsWindow.C
/ /
/ /
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
H . . . .II Description : This file contains member and other 
/ /  functions for class Beliefs Window.
/ /
/ /
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
#include ’’ BeliefsWindow.h”
void





for (i=start,j=0;i<(start +  end);i-f-f j + + )  







if (!strstr(string, FACT)) 
return string;
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temp_str =  new char[strlen(string) -f 1]; 
strcpy(tempjstr, string);
dum_str =  strchr(temp_str, ’ ,’);






temp_str =  dum_str; 
end_ptr =  strrchr(temp_str,’) ’);
*end_ptr =  NULL; 
return temp_str;
}
BeliefsWindow::BeliefsWindow(Display ^display, Window parent_win,
int marge, char *margv|],
GC gc, char *windowname, int left_x,
int left_y, unsigned int width,
unsigned int height, unsigned int border_width,






XTextProperty windowName, iconName; 
char *iconname;
fdisplay =  display;
fparent .window =  parent _win;
fgc =  gc;
iconname =  windowname; 
fleft_x =  left_x; 
fleft.y =  left_y; 
fwidth =  width; 
fheight =  height; 
fborder_width =  border.width; 
fborder =  border; 
fbackground =  background; 
fx_dist =  DELTA-X;
/ /  Create the window and store its window id
fcurrent_window =  XCreateSimpleWindow(fdisplay, fparent_window,
fleft_x, fleft.y, fwidth, 
fheight, fborder.width, 
fborder, fbackground);
xsh.flags =  (PPosition | PSize); 
xsh. height =  fheight; 
xsh.width =  fwidth;
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xsh.x — fleft_x; 
xsh.y =  fleft.y;
wmJiints.initialjstate =  NormalState; 
wmJiints.flags =  StateHint;
class_hints.res .name =  windowname; 
class-hints. res_class =  "Secure";
XStringListToTextProperty(&;windowname, 1, &;windowName); 
XStringListToTextProperty(^windowname, 1, &;iconName);
/ /  Select expose and buttonpress events for the window 
XSelectInput(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, ExposureMask | ButtonPressMask);
/ /  Create scrollbar instance
sbar =  new ScrollBar(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, fgc, 1,
1, SCROLLBAR_WIDTH, fheight - 2, 
SCROLLBAR_WIDTH +  2, INCREMENT-Y +  10 )
XMapWindow(fdisplay, fcurrent.window);
/ /  Hints to window manager
XSetWMProperties(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, &windowName,
&;iconName, margv, marge, &;xsh, &;wm_hints,
&class-hints);
if ((ffont_ptr =  XLoadQueryFont(fdisplay, fontname)) = =  NULL)
{




/ /  Initialize class variables 
theBeliefstextl.numJbeliefs =  -1; 
top-display-index =  0; 





/ /  Delete the belief strings 
for(i=0; i <  theBeliefstextl.num-beliefs; i+ + )  
delete theBeliefstextl.beliefs;
delete ffont_ptr;












Beliefs Window: :LoadBeliefs(char *text)
{
/ /  Load the belief 
theBeliefstextl.num_beliefs + =  1; 




/ /  Initialize the wrap count for that line 






/ /  Deallocate existing belief strings 
for (k=0;k<theBeliefstextl.num_beliefs;k++) 
delete theBeliefstextl .beliefsfk];
/ /  Set number of beliefs back to -1 





{ . . .
Window root_win, child.win;
int root_x, root.y, win_x, win_y, temp.y, store;
unsigned int mask;
unsigned short k, j;






if  (bottom-display-index <  theBeliefstextl.num_beliefs)
{ .
//L e t  the scrollbar do the scrolling first
sbar—i-Handle_click(button);
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if (top_displayindex >  0)
{
/ /Let the scrollbar do the scrolling first 
sbar—>-Handle_click(button);








/ /  Else where else on the window the mouse is ?
XQueryPointer(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, &root_win, &child_win,
&root_x, &root_y, &win_x, &win_y, &mask);
temp_y =  win_y/INCREMENT_Y +  top.display index;
/ /  Get the right line, considering wraps of line above the 
/ /  one on which clicked 
store =  temp_y;
for (k =  top_displayindex, j =  top_displayindex; k <  (store-1); j + + )
{
temp_y -=  theBeliefstextl.wraps[j];
theBeliefstextl.wraps[j] ? k + =  theBeliefstextl.wraps[j] : k-f-+;
}
/ /  Finally, return belief clicked on 








XTextltem *textitem ; 
unsigned short unit .text-width; 
unsigned short no.chars, i; 
short leftover, copy-from; 
short index;
unsigned short num_chars; 
char *output_text; 
unsigned int temp_y_dist;
/ /  Text width per character
unit_text_width =  XTextWidth(ffont_ptr, strip_facts(theBeliefstextl.beliefs[0]), 1); 







/ /  Initial display of beliefs 
Drawltself();
i f  (theBeliefstextl.num.beliefs >  -1)
{
for (i=0; i<theBeliefstextl.num_beliefs; i+ + )
{
leftover =  strlen(strip_facts(theBeliefstextl.beliefs[i])); 
copy .from =  0;
/ /  Till no characters left in belief... 
while ((leftover >  0) kk  (fy.dist <  fheight))
{
no.chars =  leftover >  num_chars ? num_chars : leftover; 
text Jtem =  new XTextItem[sizeof(XTextItem)]; 




leftover -=  num_chars;
/ / I f  going to wrap the line, increment its wrap count 
if (leftover >  0)
theBeliefstextl.wrapsfi] + =  1; 
copy_from + =  no_chars; 
text ite m —mchars =  no.chars; 
text Jtem-^delta =  DELTA_X; 
text Jtem—-Tont =  None;
XDrawText(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, fgc, 
fx_dist, fy.dist, text .item, 1); 
fy.dist + =  INCREMENT.Y; 
delete text item ;
}
if  (fy.dist >  fheight)
{
top .display index =  0; 




top.displayindex =  0; 
bottom-display index =  i - 1;
}
break;
/ /  Redisplay beliefs during up and down scrolling 
if  (show up)
{
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top .display index—; 
bottom-display index— ; 
index =  top-display index;
}
if  (show = =  down)
{
top -display in d ex+-f ; 
bottom_displayindex++; 
index =  bottom_displayindex;
}
/ /  fy.dist -=  INCREMENT.Y;
copy_from =  0;
leftover =  strlen(strip_facts(theBeliefstextl.beliefs[index])); 
while (leftover >  0)
{
no_chars =  leftover >  num_chars ? num_chars : leftover; 
textitem =  new XTextItem[sizeof(XTextItem)]; 
textitem —»-chars =  new char[no_chars -f 1]; 
strpartcpy (textitem —>chars, 
strip _facts(theBeliefstextl.beliefs[index]),
copy_from, no_chars); 
leftover -=  num.chars; 
copy .from +=  no.chars; 
textitem —>nchars =  no_chars; 
textitem-^delta -- DELTA-X; 
textitem —»font =  None;
XDrawText(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, fgc, fx_dist, fy_dist, 
textitem, 1);
XFlush(fdisplay);





/ /  For expose handling on the window 
Drawltself();
for (i=top_displayindex; i<bottom_displayindex; i+ + )
{ . . . .  
leftover =  strlen(strip_facts(theBeliefstextl.beliefs[i]));
copy-from =  0;
while ((leftover >  0) k,h (fy.dist <  fheight))
{
no_chars =
leftover >  num.chars ? num.chars : leftover; 
textitem =  new XTextItem[sizeof(XTextItem)]; 
textitem —»-chars =  new char[no_chars -f 1]; 
strpartcpy (textitem—»-chars,
strip _facts(theBeliefstext 1 ,beliefs[i]), 
copy_from, no.chars); 
leftover -=  num.chars; 
copy .from + =  no.chars; 
textitem —>nchars =  no.chars; 
textitem —»-delta =  DELTA_X; 
textitem —»-font =  None;
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XDrawText(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, fgc, fx_dist, 
fy-dist, text item , 1); 







/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /  File : Button.h
/ /
/ /
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
/ /
/ /  Description : This file contains the global declarations 
/ /  and class specification for class 
/ /  Button.
/ /
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
#def ine _BUTTON_
# ifn d e f _DISPLAYBASE_
#include ’’ D isplayBase.h”
#en dif
#def ine TEXT_Y-OFFSET 28
class Button : public DisplayBase
{
public:
Button(Display ^display, Window parent.win, GC gc, 
int left_x, int left_y, unsigned int width, 
unsigned int height, char *fontname, char *text); 
~Button() { delete ftext; delete ffont_ptr; }; 
void DrawButtonQ const; 
void DrawButtonText() const;
Bool Pointer_in_area() const; 





unsigned int fwidth; 




/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
i l l
Ij  File : Button.C
/ /
/ /  _
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
/ /
/ /  Description : This file contains member and other 
/ /  functions for class Button 
/ /
/ /
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
#include ” Butt on. h”
inline Bool
In_button_area(int lpos_x, int lpos_y, int 
int pos_y)
{
wd, int ht, int pos_x,
/ /  Are the coordinates within the rectangular area 
i f  ((pos_x <  (lpos_x +  wd)) kk  (pos_x >  lpos_x) kk 
(pos_y <  (lpos_y +  ht)) kk  (pos_y >  lpos.y)) 
return True;
/ / N o ,  return false 
retu rn  False;
}
Button::Button(Display ^display, Window parent_win, GC gc, 
int left_x, int left_y, unsigned int width, 
unsigned int height, char *fontname, char *text)
{
fdisplay =  display; 
fcurrent_window =  parent_win; 
fgc =  gc;
i f  (text ^  NULL)
{
/ /  Store button text
ftext =  new char[strlen(text)];
strcpy(ftext, text);
}
fleft_x =  left_x; 
fleft_y =  left _y; 
fwidth =  width; 
fheight =  height;
i f  (fontname ^  NULL)
{
i f  ((ffont.ptr =  XLoadQueryFont(fdisplay, fontname)) = =  NULL)
{










/ /  Actually draw the rectangle









/ /  Calculate position for text within the button 
text.width =  XTextWidth(ffont_ptr, ftext, strlen(ftext)); 
x.position =  fleft_x +  fwidth/2 - text_width/2;
/ /  Draw the text within the button
XDrawImageString(fdisplay, fcurrent.window, fgc, x.position,




Window root.win, child.win; 
int root_x, root.y, win_x, win.y; 
unsigned int mask;
if (XQueryPointer(fdisplay, fcurrent.window, &root_win, ^child.win, 
&root_x, &;root_y, &win_x, &win_y, &mask))








unsigned long foreground, background; 
int x.position; 
int text.width;
text.width =  XTextWidth(ffont_ptr, ftext, strlen(ftext)); 
x.position — fleft_x +  fwidth/2 - text_width/2;
foreground =  1; 




/ /  Fill the button with background colour 
XFillRectangle(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, fgc,
fleft_x, fleft_y, fwidth, fheight);
/ /  Redraw the text
XDrawImageString(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, fgc, x_position,







/ /  Clear the button area, before a redraw 
exposures =  True;
XClearArea(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, fleft_x, fleft.y, fwidth, 
fheight, exposures);
}
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
/ /  File : Control.h
/ /
/ /
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
n
II Description : This file contains the global and 
/ /  forward declarations for the Control 
/ /  module.
/ /
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
#ifndef .DISPLAYBASE. 















#include ’’StatusLine .h: 
#include ’’Gny.h”
/ /  Forward Declarations
void CreateDisplayAndLoop(int argc, char *argv[|);
void MessageXmitDisplay(MainWindow *progWin, Arc *theArc, char *text
arrowDir direction);
void
MessageXmitHighlight(MainWindow *progWin, Arc *theArc, Text *SText,
Textlnput *theTextInstance, arrowDir *dirntable, 
unsigned short flag);
void DisplayProofs(BeliefsWindow *proofsWindow, char ^string, Bool
Mode,int arge, char *argv[|);
void strpartcpy(char astringi, char *string2, short start,
short end);
/ /  Control # defines
#define CREATE 1
#define DRAW  2
#define W IN D O W JD  3
#def ine HIGHLIGHT 1
#def ine UNHIGHLIGHT 2
#def ine BELIEFS-LIMIT 2
#def ine T E X TJN C R E M E N T .Y  20
#def ine SUPER_TEXT_LENGTH 70
#def ine MAX_TEXT_LENGTH 35
#define FONTNAM E "*helvetica-bold-r*140*"









/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
/ /  File : Control.C
/ /
/ /  _
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
u  . . .
/ /  Description : This file contains the main program 
/ / o f  the Protocol Analyzer and functions 
/ / i n  the Control module.
/ /
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
#include ”Control.h” 
int
main(int arge, char *argv[|)
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{
char *display_name =  NULL;
if (argc <  3)
{
cerr <C "Invalid argument(s) \n";
cerr <C "Usage : secure Cmessages filename> <assumptions filename>
\ n " ;  _
exit(l);
}
/ /  Open connection to X  server
if ((tdisplay =  XOpenDisplay(display_name)) = =  NULL) 
cerr <  argv[0] <  "  : Cannot connect to X server"
<C XDisplayName(display_name) <C "\n";
/ / A  default GC for all graphics
gc =  XDefaultGC(tdisplay, XDefaultScreen(tdisplay));
//C reate all the components, display them and wait in an 
/ /event loop
CreateDisplayAndLoop(argc, argv);





CreateDisplayAndLoop(int argc, char *argv[])
{
char *sl_text := "Welcome to the Secure Protocol Analyzer"; 
char *exit_text =  "Protocol run over. Exiting ! ! " ;
XEvent report;
unsigned short i, no.beliefs, j;
char *str, step_text[30];
unsigned short num_nodes, beliefs_count;
Node *node_S;
Text *SampleText, *SText; 








Gny *theGnyA, *theGnyB, *theGnyS;
Bool displayed_all_a =  False;
Bool displayed_all_b =  False;
Bool displayed_all_s =  False;
Bool reedit =  False, entered_reedit =  False;








/ /  Name of assumptions file 
strcpy(assfile, argv[2]);
/ /  Create text instance object




num_nodes =  textlnstance—»return _num_nodes();
/ /  Load the entity names 
node_cnt =  0;
tstr =  textlnstance—>Return .sender _name(); 
while (tstr ^  NULL)
{
strcpy(nodes[node_cnt+-f], tstr);
tstr =  textlnstance—► Return -sender _name();
}
/ /Initialize beliefs set count 
beliefs .count =  0;




BASE-W D, BASE-HT, BASE_X, BASE.Y);
/ /  Create the status line
StatusLine line(tdisplay, program-window.base_window(), gc, common-font,
1, BASE-HT - 25, BASE-W D, 25);
/ /  Create Button "GO"
Button Button_Go(tdisplay, program-window.base_window(),
gc, 100, 50, BUTTO N -W D , BUTTON-HT, common-font, 
"GO");
/ /  Create Button "RUN"
Button Button_Run(tdisplay, program-window.base_window(),
gc, 250, 50, BU TTO N -W D , BUTTON-HT, common-font, 
"RUN");
/ /  Create Button "RE-EDIT"
Button Button_Reedit(tdisplay, program_window.base_window(),
gc, 400, 50, BUTTON_WD, BUTTON-HT, common-font, 
"RE-EDIT");
/ /  Create Button "QUIT"
Button Button_Quit(tdisplay, program_window.base_window(),
gc, 550, 50, BUTTON_WD, BUTTON-HT, common-font, 
"QUIT");
/ /  Create Server node if required . . .  
if (num_nodes = =  3)
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{
node_S =  new Node(tdisplay,
program_window.base_window(), gc, common_font, nodes[21 
350, 200,
N OD E.W ID TH , NODE.W IDTH, CIRCLE-START, CIRCLE-END); 
arc_AS =  new Arc(tdisplay,
program_window.base_window(), gc, 360, 255, 295, 335); 
arc_SB =  new Arc(tdisplay,
program.window.base_window(), gc, 470, 335, 400, 255);
/ /  Create Node A 
Node node_A(tdisplay,
program_window.base_window(), gc, common_font, nodes[0],
250, 330, NODE-W IDTH, NODE-WIDTH, CIRCLE-START,
CIRCLE-END);
/ /  Create Node B 
Node node_B(tdisplay,
program_window.base_window(), gc, common-font,
nodes[l], 450, 330, NODE-WIDTH, NODE-WIDTH, CIRCLE-START,
CIRCLE-END);
/ /  Create Arc AB 
arc_AB =  new Arc(tdisplay,
program-window.base_window(), gc, 250 +  NODE-WIDTH, 360,
450, 360);
/ /  Create Beliefs Window for Node A 
sprintf(local_str,"Beliefs of '/.s",nodes[0]); 
node_A_bw[beliefs_count] =  new BeliefsWindow(tdisplay, 
DefaultRootWindow(tdisplay), 
argc, argv,





/ /  Create Beliefs Window for Node B 
sprintf(local_str,"Beliefs of */,s",nodes[l]); 
node_B_bw[beliefs_count] =  new BeliefsWindow(tdisplay, 
DefaultRootWindow(tdisplay), 
argc, argv,





/ /  Create Beliefs Window for Node S if need be. .. 
i f  (num_nodes = =  3)
{
sprintf(local_str,"Beliefs of '/,s",nodes[2]); 









/ /  Get the direction of arrows from text input object 
dirntable =  textlnstance—>ReturnArrowsTable();
/ /  Initialize y direction offset for beliefs’ display 
node_A_bw[beliefs_count]-+Init_y_offset(); 
node_B_bw[beliefs_count]—►Init_y_offset(); 
if  (num_nodes = =  3)
node_S_bw[beliefs_count]-^Init_y_offset();
/ /  Display the belief sub windows 
node_A_bw[beliefs_count]—¡-Drawltself(); 
node_B_bw[beliefs_count]—>-DrawItself(); 
if  (num_nodes = =  3)
node_S_bw[beliefs_count]—>-DrawItself();
/ /  Create G N Y object for A 
theGnyA =  new Gny(nodes[0], assfile);
/ /  Create G NY object for B 
theGnyB =  new Gny(nodes[l], assfile);
/ /  Create GNy object for S 
if  (num_nodes = =  3)
theGnyS =  new Gny(nodes[2], assfile);
/ /  Parse output file for GNY objects 
theGnyA^Gny_parse_file(assfile, BELIEFS); 
theGnyB—>Gny_parse_file(assfile, BELIEFS); 
i f  (num_nodes = =  3)
theGnyS—>Gny_parseJile(assfile, BELIEFS);
/ /  Load beliefs into belief window objects 
no.beliefs =  theGnyA—>Gny_num_beliefs(); 
for (i=0;i<(no_beliefs-l);i++)
{
str =  theGnyA—>Gny_return_current_belief(); 
node_A_bw[beliefs_count]^-LoadBeliefs(str);
}
no.beliefs =  theGnyB—>Gny_num_beliefs(); 
for (i=0;i<(no_beliefs-l);i++)
{ .
str =  theGnyB—>-Gny_return-current_belief();
node_B_bw[beliefs_countj—»-LoadBeliefs(str);
}
i f  (num_nodes - -=  3)
{
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noJbeliefs =  theGnyS—>Gny_num_beliefs(); 
for (i=0;i<(no_beliefs-l);i++)
{
str =  theGnyS—►Gny_return_current_belief(); 
node_S_bw[beliefs_count]—►LoadBeliefs(str);
}
/ /  Delete existing G NY objects 
delete theGnyA; 
delete theGnyB; 
i f  (numjQodes = =  3) 
delete theGnyS;
//S ingle step count initialization 
Go_loop_count =  -1;
/ /  Program’s event loop...
/ /  Never say die.......
while(TRUE)
{





/ /  Clicked on QUIT ? 
if (Button_Quit.Pointerin_area())
{





/ /  Clicked on GO ? 
if (Button_Go.Pointer_in_area())
{ . . .
/ /  Great, its single-stepping now
Button_Go.Do_click();
/ /  One step over 
GoJoop.count =
(Go_loop_count+l) % textlnstance—^NumMessages();




/ /  Create Beliefs Window for Node A  
sprintf(localjstr,






gc, local_str, 50, 500, 400,





/ /  Create Beliefs Window for Node B 
sprintf(local_str,










/ /  Create Beliefs Window for Node S if need be., 
if (num_nodes = =  3)
{
sprintf(localjstr,





gc, localjstr, 100, 300,













if (num_nodes = =  3)
node_S_bw[beliefs_count]-^-DrawItself();
GoJoop.count =  -1;
/ /  Set entered flag to false as we no 
/ /  longer need initial actions done above 
entered _reedit =  False;
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delete textlnstance;




num_nodes =  textlnstance—»-return_num_nodes();
/ /  Initialize message counter to 0 
/ /  textlnstance—»-Reinitialize_message_count();
}
/ /  Is it still okay to single-step
if (GoJoop_count <  textlnstance—>NumMessages())
{
sprintf(step_text,
"Single Step option : Step */,d",
Go Joop_count+1); 
line. Clear Text Area(); 
line. Display Text(step .text);
/ /  Get next message
msgStruct =  textInstance-^NextMessage(); 
node_A_bw[beliefs_count]—Tnit_y_offset(); 
node_B_bw[beliefs_count]—Tnit_y_offset(); 
if (numjiodes —=  3)
node_S_bw[beliefs_count]—Tnit_y_ofFset(); 
SText =  new Text(tdisplay,
program-window.base_window(), gc, 




/ /  Create GNY object for A 
theGnyA =  new Gny(nodes[0], assfile);
/ /  Create GNY object for B 
theGnyB =  new Gny(nodes[l], assfile);
if (num_nodes = =  3)
/ /  Create GNY object for B
theGnyS =  new Gny(nodes[2], assfile);
/ /  Destroy existing beliefs in A and B 
node_A_bw[beliefs_count]—>-DestroyBeliefs();
/ /  Load Beliefs into node A ’s window object 
theGnyA—»-Gny_get_beliefs_and_proofs(fileName,
BELIEFS, NULL);









/ /  Destroy B ’s beliefs
node_B_bw[beliefs_count]—»Destroy Beliefs();
/ /  Load Beliefs into node B ’s window object 
theGnyB—»Gny_get_beliefs_and_proofs(fileName, 
BELIEFS, NULL);
no.beliefs =  theGnyB—»Gny_num_beliefs(); 
for (i=0;i<(no_beliefs-l);i++)
{





if (num_nodes = =  3)
{
/ /  Destroy S’s beliefs
node_S.bw[beliefs_count]—»Destroy Beliefs();
/ /  Load Beliefs into node B ’s window object 
theGnyS—»Gny_get_beliefs_and_proofs( 
fileName, BELIEFS, NULL); 





















arc_AB, msgStruct—»-message, left); 
if (num_nodes = =  3)
{







/ /  arc SB < ­
if ((!strcmp(msgStruct—»-receiver, nodes[l])) 




/ /  arc AS —*•
if ((!strcmp(msgStruct—»-sender, nodes[2]))




/ /  arc AS < ­







/ /  Delete current GNY objects 
delete theGnyA; 
delete theGnyB; 
if (num_nodes = =  3) 
delete theGnyS;
}





/ /  Was it RUN you said ? 
if (Button_Run.Pointer_in_area())
{
/ /  Just run through the protocol
Button_Run.Do_click(); 
line.ClearText Area();
line.DisplayText("Selected Run of the protocol"); 
if (num_nodes —— 3)
{ . .
/ /  Different for 3 principals
for(j=0; j <  textlnstance—>-NumMessages(); j+ + )
{
sprintf(step_text,




msgStruct =  textInstance-+NextMessage();
if ((!strcmp(msgStruct-^sender, nodes[0]))
kk  (!strcmp(msgStruct-+receiver, nodes[l]))) 
MessageXmitDisplay(&;program_window, 
arc_AB, msgStruct—»message, right); 
if ((!strcmp(msgStruct—»-receiver, nodes[0]))
kk  (!strcmp(msgStruct—»-sender, nodes[l]))) 
MessageXmitDisplay(&program_window, 
arc_AB, msgStruct—»message, left); 
if ((!strcmp(msgStruct—»-sender, nodesfl]))
kk  (!strcmp(msgStruct—»receiver, nodes[2]))) 
MessageXmitDisplay(&;program_window, 
arc_SB, msgStruct—»message, right); 
if ((!strcmp(msgStruct—»-receiver, nodes[l]))
kk  (!strcmp(msgStruct—»sender, nodes[2]))) 
MessageXmitDisplay(&;program_window, 
arc_SB, msgStruct—»message, left); 
if ((!strcmp(msgStruct—»-sender, nodes[2]))
kk  (!strcmp(msgStruct—»-receiver, nodes[0]))) 
MessageXmitDisplay(&program_window, 
arc_AS, msgStruct-+message, right); 
if ((!strcmp(msgStruct—̂ receiver, nodes[2]))








/ /  Only 2 principals A and B
for (j=0; j <  textlnstance—»-NumMessagesO; j + + )
{
msgStruct =  textlnstance—»NextMessage(); 
if ((!strcmp(msgStruct—»-sender, nodes[0]))
kk  (!strcmp(msgStruct—►receiver, nodes[l]))) 
MessageXmitDisplay(&;program_window, 
arc_AB, msgStruct—»message, right); 
if ((!strcmp(msgStruct—»-receiver, nodes[0]))
kk  (!strcmp(msgStruct—»-sender, nodes[l]))) 
MessageXmitDisplay(&program_window, 








/ /  Did you click on a beliefs subwindow, by any 
/ /  chance ?
if (report.xbutton.window = =
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if  (retjstr ^  NULL)
{
if  (¡proofMode)
/ /  Display proofs now.. 
proofsWindow =  new BeliefsWindow(tdisplay, 
DefaultRoot Window(tdisplay ), 







DisplayProofs(proofsWindow, ret_str, proofMode, 
arge, argv);






/ /  Improper mouse click 
line.ClearText Area() ; 
line. Display Text (
"Click on belief line beginning with the
}
}






if (ret-str /  NULL)
{
if  (IproofMode)
/ /  Display proofs now..
proofsWindow =  new BeliefsWindow(tdisplay,
DefaultRootWindow(tdisplay), 











proofMode =  True;
/ /  Did you click on S ’s beliefs 











/ /  Display proofs now..
proofsWindow =  new BeliefsWindow(tdisplay,
DefaultRoot Window(tdisplay), 







DisplayProofs(proofsWindow, ret_str, proofMode, 
argc, argv); 
proofMode =  True;
}
}
/ /  Did you click on Re-editing
if (Button_Reedit.Pointer_in_area())
{
/ /  Update status line first 
line.ClearTextArea();
line.DisplayText("Selected R e-edit of b e l i e f s " ) ;
/ /  Set re-edit mode to true 
reedit =  True;
/ /  Build command and execute it for retaining 
/ /  original assumptions file 
strcpy(assfile, "assump_2");
/ /  Delete any previous duplicate files 
unlink(assfile);
sprintf(cpstr,"cp '/,s */,s \n", argv[2], 
assfile);
system(cpstr);
/ /  Re-edit assumptions, call handler for it 
program_window.Reedit_handler(assfile);
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/ /  Reset some variables
displayecLalLa =  displayecLalLb =  displayed _all_s 
=  False;































/ / I f  re-editing done, got to redraw new 
/ /  beliefs subwindows 
if (beliefs_count >  0)
{ . . . .
/ / I f  reediting is done, also display previous
/ /  beliefs
















if  (num_nodes = =  3)










= =  node_A_bw[beliefs_count]—»Window Jd())
{
node_A_bw[beliefs_count]—»Drawltself(); 




{ . . .
node_A_bw[beliefs_count]—»-Display Beliefs(all);
displayed.alLa =  True;
}
}








{ . . .
node_B_bw[beliefs_count]—»-Display Beliefs(all);
displayed.alLb =  True;
}
}
if (num_nodes = =  3)
if (report.xexpose.window = =
node_S_bw[beliefs_count]—»-Window Jd())
node_S_bw[beliefs_count]-+DrawItself(); 









/ / I f  proofs are being displayed, redisplay them 
if  (proofMode)













MessageXmitDisplay(MainWindow *progWin, Arc *theArc, char *text, 
arrowDir direction)
{
Text *SampleText, *SampleText2; 
short len; 
int posx, posy;
char tempstrl[40], tempstr2[40]; 
Bool wrapped, super;
super — wrapped — False;
if  (theArc = =  arc_AB)
{
/ /  Coords for arc AB 
posx =  300; 
posy =  450;
}
if  (theArc = =  arc_AS)
{
/ /  Coords for arc AS 
posx =  50; 
posy =  300; 
len =  strlen(text);
/ / I f  text is really long then just display it below the 
/ /  diagram
if  (len >  SUPER-TEXT_LENGTH)
{
posx =  50; 
posy =  450; 
super =  True;
}
else
/ /  Check if text overshoots beyond some length 
i f  (len >  M AX_TEXT_LENGTH)
{
wrapped =  True;
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}
strpartcpy(tempstr2, text, MAX_TEXT_LENGTH, len); 
strpartcpy(tempstr 1, text, 0, MAX_TEXT_LENGTH - 1);
}
if  (theArc = =  arc_SB)
{
/ /  Coords for arc SB 
posx =  450; 
posy =  300; 
len =  strlen(text);
/ / I f  text is really long then just display it below the 
/ /  diagram
if  (len >  SUPER_TEXT_LENGTH)
{
posx =  50; 




/ /  Check if  text overshoots beyond some length 
if  (len >  MAX_TEXT_LENGTH)
{
wrapped — True;
strpartcpy(tempstr2, text, MAX_TEXT_LENGTH, len); 
strpartcpy(tempstrl, text, 0, MAX_TEXT_LENGTH - 1);
}
}
if  (theArc = =  arc_AB)
{
/ /  Just a simple arc AB
SampleText =  new Text(tdisplay, progWin—*base_window(), gc,







/ /  Just draw one line of text
SampleText =  new Text(tdisplay, progWin-^-base_window(),








/ /  Two instances of Text for two lines
SampleText =  new Text(tdisplay, progWin—>-base_window(), gc, 
common_font, posx, posy, tempstrl);
SampleText—>-DrawText();
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SampleText2 =  new Text(tdisplay, progWin—>base_window(), gc,
common_font, posx, posy -f 

















MessageXmitHighlight(MainWindow *progWin, Arc *theArc, Text *SampleText,
Textlnput *theTextInstance, arrowDir *dirntable, 
unsigned short flag)
{ _
static short count =  0;





else i f  (flag = =  UNHIGHLIGHT)













/ /  Actually draw the proofs window 
proofsWindow—Tnit_y_offset(); 
proofsWindow—»-DrawItselfQ;
gnyObject =  new G ny("T", assfile);
/ /  Build file name 
sprintf(tstr,"m_'/.d",Go_loop_count);
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/ /  Get proofs into object
gnyObject—>Gny_get_beliefs_and_proofs(tstr, PROOFS, string); 
i f  (Mode)
proofsWindow—»-Destroy BeliefsQ;
/ /  Load proofs
for (i=0;i<gnyObject—>Gny_num_beliefs(); i+ + )
proofsWindow—>LoadBeliefs(gnyObject—>-Gny_return_current_belief())
/ /  Display them finally 
proofsWindow—>DrawItself(); 
proofsWindow-^DisplayBeliefs(all);








/ /  Simple transfer loop 
for (i=start,j=0;i<(start +  en d );i-f-+ j++)  
stringl[j] =  string2[i] ;
}
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
/ /  File : DisplayBase.h
/ /
/ /
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
/ /  .
/ /  Description : This file contains the global declarations
/ /  and class specification for class 
/ /  DisplayBase.
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
»d e fin e  .DISPLAYBASE.
#include <X11/Xlib.h>
#include <X11/Xutil.h>
#include <X ll/X os.h >
#include <std io .h >




/ /  Global# defines
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#def ine TRUE 1
#defin e  FALSE 0
#defin e  BASE_WD 800
#defin e  B ASEJIT 600
#defin e B A SE .X  200
#defin e BASE_Y 200
#def ine NOD E-W IDTH  60
#def ine DISPLAY_CENTRE_X 400
#def ine B U T TO N -W D  100
#def ine BUTTON_HT 50
#def ine CIRCLE JSTART 0
#def ine CIRCLE-END 360*64
#defin e SCROLLBAR_WIDTH 17
#def ine DEFAULT-TEXT-HEIGHT 30
#def ine LINELENGTH 140
#defin e BELIEFS 1
#defin e PROOFS 2
#defin e ENTITY-LENGTH 5
#def ine M AX-NODES 5
#defin e FLAG " f l a g "
#defin e FACT " f a c t "
#def ine POSSESSES "po ss e s s e s ( "
#def ine TOLD " t o l d ( "
#defin e CONVEYED "conveyed("
#defin e BELIEVES "b e lie v e s ( "
#defin e REASON " ,  reason ("
#defin e REASON-SP " ,r e a s o n ("
#defin e E X T  "e x t ( "
#defin e STAR " s t a r ( "
#defin e CO M M A
#def ine GNYJNPUTFILE "temp"
#define GNY-ASSUMPTIONSFILE "assumptions"
/ /  Typedef for beliefs display 







/ /  Typedef for arc direction 





/ /  Typedef for messages structure 

















/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /  File : DisplayBase.C
/ /
/ /  _
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
/ /
/ /  Description : This file contains the member 
/ /  functions for the class DisplayBase 
/ /
/ /
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
#include ’’DisplayBase .h”
/ /  Default Pointer_in_area in base class 
Bool
DisplayBase::PointerJn_area() const
{ . . .
Window root_win, child.win;
int root_x, root.y, win_x, win_y; 
unsigned int mask;
/ /  Return true if in my area
if  (XQueryPointer(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, &root_win, &child_win, &root_x, 




/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
/ /  File : Gny.h
/ /
/ /  .
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
/ /  . . .
/ /  Description : This file contains the global declarations
/ /  and class specification for class Gny.
/ /
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/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
# ifn d e f -DISPLAYBASE.
#include ’’DisplayBase .h”
#en dif
#include < s t d io .h >
#include < s t d l ib .h >
#include < s t r in g .h >
#include < u n is td .h >
#include < c ty p e .h >
/ /  Class Gny # defines
#def ine OUTPUTFILENAME "xsb_output"
#def ine NEWLINE "\n"
#def ine MEMORY.SIZE 2000 
#def ine MAX_BELIEFS 100 
#define MAX_PROOFS 100 
#def ine BELIEFSLENGTH 550 




Gny(char *str, char ^filename);
~G ny() { delete Reliefs; delete fname_node; unlink(OUTPUTFILENAME); };
void Gny_get_beliefs_and_proofs(char *input_filename); 
void Gny_get_beliefs_and_proofs(char *input_filename, 
unsigned short flag, char *input_text); 
char* Gny_return_current_belief();
unsigned short Gny_num_beliefs() { return fnumJbeliefs; }; 






unsigned short fnum_beliefs; 
unsigned short fpointer.b;
};
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
/ /  File : Gny.C
/ /
/ /  . .
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
/ /
/ /  Description : This file contains member and other 
/ /  functions for class Gny.
/ /
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/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
#include ” Gny .h”
/ /
inline Bool
MatchStrings(char *strl, char *str2)
{ _
unsigned short len; 
unsigned short cnt;
len =  strlen(str2);
for (cnt =  0;cnt <  len;cnt-f+) 










if  (!strstr(string, FACT)) 
return string;
temp_str =  new char[strlen(string) -f 1]; 
strcpy(temp_str, string);
dum_str =  strchr(temp_str, ’ , ’);






tempjstr =- dum_str; 
end_ptr =  strrchr(tempjstr,’) ’);












local_str_tag =  FALSE; 
local_str =  NULL;
if  (!strstr(inputString, POSSESSES) kk  !strstr(inputString, TOLD) kk 
!strstr(inputString, CONVEYED) kk  !strstr(inputString, 
BELIEVES)) 
return NULL;
copy_str =  strip_facts(inputString); 
if (flag = =  PROOFS)
{
/ /  Filter out necessary staements for proofs 
local_str =  inputString;
w hile (!isdigit(*localjstr) kk  (*localjstr ^  NULL)) 
local_str++;
if  ((isdigit(*local_str) kk  (*(local_str +  1) = =  ’ .’)) 
kk  (strstr(local_str, POSSESSES) || 
strstr(local_str, TOLD) || 
strstr(local_str, CONVEYED) || 
strstr(local_str, BELIEVES)))
{
local jstr[strlen(local_str)-l] =  NULL;
return local_str; .
}
if (*localjstr = =  NULL) 
return NULL;
}
/ /  For beliefs... 
memset(tempstr, 0, 20);
sprintf(tempstr,"'/,s'/,s",POSSESSES,nameNode); 
local_str_tag =  MatchStrings(copy_str, tempstr); 




local-str_tag =  MatchStrings(copy_str, tempstr);
}
if  (!local_str_tag )
{
memset(tempstr, 0, 20);
sprintf(tempstr,"'/, s'/, s " ,  CONVEYED, nameNode); 
local_str_tag =  MatchStrings(copy_str, tempstr);
}
i f  (!localjstr_tag )
{
memset(tempstr, 0, 20);
sprintf(tempstr, "'/,s’/,s " , BELIEVES,nameNode); 





r e t u r n  in p u tS trin g ;
retu rn  NULL;
}
Gny::Gny(char *str, char ^filename)
{
fnum_beliefs =  0; 
fpointer.b =  0;
/ /  Allocate space for the name of the node and copy it 
fname_node =  new char[strlen(str) +  1]; 
strcpy(fname_node, str);
/ /  Set assumptions filename






char *local_str, *t_str; 
char ano_str[20];
localjstr =  strstr(line, POSSESSES); 
i f  (local_str —=  NULL)
local_str =  strstr(line, TOLD); 
i f  (local_str —— NULL)
local_str =  strstr(line, CONVEYED); 
if  (local_str = =  NULL)
localjstr =  strstr(line, BELIEVES);
if  (localjstr ^ NULL)
{ . . .
/ /  Get pointer to actual belief in line
if (local_str =  strstr(line, COMMA)) 
local_str++;
t-str =  strstr(local_str,REASON); 
i f  (tjstr = =  NULL)
tjstr =  strstr(local_str, REASONJSP); 
i f  (tjstr ^  NULL)
{








Gny::Gny_get_beliefs_and_proofs(char *input_filename, unsigned short flag,
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char tempjstring[80], appendstring[40]; 
char local_filel[] =  "localm essagef i l e " ;  





/ /  While debugging only
unlink(localJilel);
unlink(local_file2);
/ /  Initialize standard commands for xsb interaction 
strcpy(commands[0], " [basics,control,gny_m od] 
sprintf(commands[l],"analyze('/,s). ",local_filel); 
if  (flag = =  BELIEFS)
strcpy(commands[2], " l i s t i n g .  ") ;
else
if (flag = =  PROOFS)
{ . . . .
t_str =  trim_belief_line(input_text);
sprintf(commands[2],"explain_proof (*/,s). ",t_str);
}
/ /  All operations on a local file
sprintf(appendstring,"cp */,s */,s",inputJilename, localJilel);
/ /  Execute command built above 
system(appendstring);
/ /  Append assumptions file to message file 
memset(appendstring,0, 40);
sprintf(appendstring,"cat '/,s > >  '/,s",fassumptionsfile, 
localJilel);
system(appendstring);
fptr =  fopen(localJile2,,,w+H);





/ /  Run the G N Y tool with the files created so far and store the 
/ /  output in another file
sprintf(temp_string, "xsb -m '/,d - i  <  */,s >  '/.s", MEMORY-SIZE, 
localJile2, OUTPUTFILENAME);
/ /  Execute the xsb process 
system(temp ̂ string);
Gny-parseJile(OUTPUTFILENAME, flag);
c h a r  *in p u t_tex t)
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/ /  Open GNY output file 
fptr =  fopen(filename, " r - f ") ; 
if  (fptr = =  NULL) return;
count =  fnum.beliefs;
/ /  Load valid beliefs into GNY object 
w hile (Ifeof(fptr) kk  (count <  199))
{
memset(readstring, 0, BELIEFSLENGTH); 
fgets(readstring, BELIEFSLENGTH, fptr); 
tjstring =  CheckString(readstring, fname_node, flag); 
if (t_string ^ NULL)
{







/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
/ /  File : MainWindow.h
/ /
/ /  .
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
/ /  .
/ /  Description : This file contains the global declarations
/ /  and class specification for the class 
/ /  Main Window.
' i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i n u i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
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# ifn d e f _DISPLAYBASE_
#include ’’DisplayBase . h.”
#endif
#def ine COM M AND-LENGTH 25





class MainWindow : public DisplayBase
{ . 
public:
MainWindow(int marge, char *margv[],
Window parent.wid, GC gc, char *window_name, char *icon_name, 
Display ^display, short width, short height, 
short start_x, short start_y);
MainWindow();
void DrawWindow() const;










/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
/ /  File : MainWindow.C
/ /
/ /  _
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
/ /  .
/ /  Description : This file contains member functions
/ /  for the class MainWindow
/ /
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
#include ”MainWindow.h”
MainWindow::MainWindow(int marge, char *margv[],
Window parent_wid, GC gc, char *window_name, 
char * icon _name,
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{
Display ^display, short width, short height, 
short start_x;, short start_y )
/ /  Set class variables 
fdisplay =  display; 
fgc =  gc;
fwin_name — windowjiame; 
ficon_name =  icon_name; 
fstart_x =  start _x; 
fstart_y =  start _y; 
fsize_x =  width; 
fsize_y =  height;
/ /  Create the base window first
fcurrent_window =  XCreateSimpleWindow(fdisplay, parent_wid,





xsh.flags =  (PPosition | PSize); 
xsh.height =  height; 
xsh.width =  width; 
xsh.x =  start_x; 
xsh.y =  start_y;
wm_hints.initial_state =  NormalState; 
wmJhints.flags =  StateHint;
class_hints.res_name = fwin_name;
/ /  Window name to window manager
if (XStringListToTextProperty(&fwin_name, 1, &;windowName) ==  0)
1 .
cerr <C fwin_name <C
" : structure a llocation  for windowName fa i le d . \n"; 
exit (-1);
}
if (XStringListToTextProperty(&fwin_name, 1, ¿ziconName) ==  0)
{
cerr <C fwin_name <C
" : structure a llocation  for iconName fa i le d . \n"; 
exit (-1);
}
/ /  Hints to window manager
XSetWMProperties(fdisplay, fcurrent.window, &windowName, ^iconName, 











/ /  Set mask for Expose, ButtonPress and KeyPress events 
XSelectInput(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, ExposureMask | ButtonPressMask 
| KeyPressMask );
/ /  Map base window 
XMapWindow(fdisplay, fcurrent_window);






{ . . . .








/ /  Get environment variable EDITOR  
editor =  getenv("EDITOR");
if  (editor = =  NULL)
{ .
/ /  Tough.., use vi
editor =  new char[strlen("vi") +  1]; 
strcpy(editor, "v i " ) ;
}
/ /  Build the command for xterm
sprintf(command,"xterm -e ’/.s ’/.s",editor, assumpJile);
/ /  Execute the xterm with editor now 
system(command);




/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
n . . . .
/ /  Description : This file contains the class specification 
/ /  for class Node.
/ /
/ /
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
# iin d e i .DISPLAYBASE.
#include ’’DisplayBase.h”
#endif
class Node : public DisplayBase
{
public:
Node(Display ^display, Window parent_win, GC gc, char *fontname, 
char *node_name, int pos_x, int pos_y, unsigned int width, 
unsigned int height, unsigned int anglel, unsigned int angle2)












/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
/ /  File : Node.C
/ /
/ /  .
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
/ /
/ /  Description : This file contains member and other 
/ /  functions for class Node.
/ /
#include ’’ Node.h”
inline Bool . . .  . \
In_circular_area(int centre_x, int centre.y, int radius, int pt_x, int pt_y)
/ /  Are coords within circular area of node 
if  ((((pt_x - centre_x)*(pt_x - centre_x)) +
((pt_y - centre.y) * (pt_y - centre.y)))
<  (radius * radius))
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r e t u r n  True;
/ / N o ,  return false 
return False;
}
Node::Node(Display ^display, Window parent_win, GC gc, char *fontname, 
char *node_name, int pos_x, int pos_y, unsigned int width, 
unsigned int height, unsigned int anglel, unsigned int angle2)
{
XFontStruct *font_ptr;
fdisplay =  display;
fcurrent .window =  parent_win;
fgc =  gc;
fnode_name =  new char[strlen(node_name) +  1];
strcpy(fnode_name, node_name);
fpos_x =  pos_x;
fpos_y =  pos_y;
fwidth =  width;
fheight =  height;
fanglel =  anglel;
fangle2 =  angle2;
/ /  Load font specified in fontname
if ((font_ptr =  XLoadQueryFont(fdisplay, fontname)) = =  NULL)
{








/ /  Draw the node
XDrawArc(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, fgc, fpos_x, fpos_y, fwidth, fheight, 
fanglel, fangle2);






int offset _x, offset _y;
offset _x =  fwidth/2; 
offset _y =  fheight/2;
/ /  Draw principal’s name within node
XDrawImageString(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, fgc, fpos_x + offset_x, 






{ . . .
Window root_win, child.win;
int root_x, root.y, win_x, win_y;
unsigned int mask;
int centre_x, centre_y;
centre_x =  fpos_x +  (fwidth/2); 
centre_y =  fpos.y +  (fheight/2);
/ /  Got to check if  you clicked in my circle
if (XQueryPointer(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, &root_win, &;child_win, 
&;root_x, &;root_y, &win_x, &win_y, ¿¿mask)) 




/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
/ /  File : ScrollBar.h
/ /
/ /  . .
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
/ /  . .
/ /  Description : This file contains the global declarations
/ /  and class specification for the class 
/ /  ScrollBar.
/ /
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
#def ine .SCROLLBAR.
# ifn d e f .DISPLAYBASE.
#include ’’DisplayBase.h”
#endif
# ifn d e f .B U T T O N .
#include ” Butt on. h”
#endif
/ /  y direction offset
#def ine IN CR EM ENT.Y 15
class ScrollBar : public Button
{
public:
ScrollBar(Display ^display, Window parent.win, GC gc, 
int left jc, int left.y, unsigned int width, 
unsigned int height, unsigned int offset_x, 
unsigned int offset.y);
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unsigned int foffset_y; 
unsigned int current_scroll_x:; 
unsigned int current_scroll_y; 
unsigned int width_text_area; 
unsigned int height_text_area;
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
/ /  File : ScrollBar.C
/ /
/ /
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
/ /
II Description : This file contains member functions for 
/ /  the class ScrollBar.
/ /
/ /
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
#include ’’ScrollBar .h”
ScrollBar::ScrollBar(Display ^display, Window parent.win, GC gc,
int left jx, int left.y, unsigned int width, 
unsigned int height, unsigned int offset_x, 
unsigned int offset.y) : Button(display, 
parent.win, gc, left_x, left_y, width, height, 
NULL, NULL)
{
fdisplay =  display;
fcurrent_window =  parent_win;
fgc =  gc;
fleft_x =  left_x;
fleft_y =  left.y;
fwidth =  width;
fheight =  height;
foffset_y =  offset _y;
current^croll_x =  fleft_x +  offset_x; 
current_scroll_y =  fleft.y;
/ /  Width of enclosing text area less by size of scrollbar 
width_text_area =  400 - offset_x;
/ /  Height same









/ /  Scroll down 




/ /  Scroll up 












/ /  Clear one line at the top 
XClearArea(fdisplay, fcurrent.window,




current_scroll_y -=  fofFset_y;
/ /  Copy bottom area to top
XCopyArea(fdisplay, fcurrent.window, fcurrent.window, 
fgc, current_scroll_x, current_scroll_y, 
width-text .area, height-text .area, 
current_scroll_x, currentjscrolLy +  
fofFset.y);
/ /  Clear small line portion below 
XClearArea(fdisplay, fcurrent.window,









foffset-y , exposures); 
current_scroll_y + =  fofFset.y;
/ /  Copy top portion below
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XCopyArea(fdisplay, fcurrent.window, fcurrent.window, 
fgc, current_scroll_K, current_scroll_y, 
width.text.area, height.text.area, 
current_scroll_x, current_scroll_y - 
foffset.y);
/ /  Clear topmost line 
XClearArea(fdisplay, fcurrent.window,







/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /  _
/ /  File : StatusLine.h
/ /
/ /  .
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
/ /  .
/ /  Description : This file contains the global declarations
/ /  and class specification for the class 
/ /  StatusLine.
' l l l l l l l l l l l l l l i t l l l l l l l l i l l l l l l l l l l U l l l t l l l l l l l l l l l l l U I I
# ifn d e i _DISPLAYBASE_
#inclu de ’’ D isplayB ase. h”
#en d if
/ /  y direction offset 
#def ine Y .O FFSET 18
class StatusLine : public DisplayBase
{
public:
StatusLine(Display ^display, Window parent.win, GC gc, char *fontname, 
int posjc, int pos.y, int width, int height),
void DrawStatusLineQ const; 
void  DisplayText(char *text) const, 










/ /  File : StatusLine.C
/ /
/ /
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
/ /
/ /  Description : This file contains the member functions 
/ /  for class StatusLine.
/ /
/ /
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
#include ’’ S tatusL in e.h”
StatusLine::StatusLine(Display ^display, Window parent_win, GC gc, 
char *fontname, int pos_x, int pos_y, int width, int height)
{
fdisplay =: display;
fcurrent _window =  parent.win;
fgc =  gc;
fpos_x =  pos_x;
fpos_y =  pos_y;
fwidth =  width;
fheight =  height;
/ /  Load font for this object
if ((fpJont =  XLoadQueryFont(fdisplay, fontname)) = =  NULL)
{








unsigned long foreground, background;
foreground = 1; 
background = 0;
XSetForeground(fdisplay, fgc, foreground); 
XSetBackground(fdisplay, fgc, background);
}
// Draw a box filled with background colour 
XFillRectangle(fdisplay, fcurrent.window, fgc, fpos_x, fpos.y, 
fwidth, fheight);
void
StatusLine: :DisplayText(char »text) const
{
int x_position; 
short text Jen; 
int text .width;
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text Jen =  strlen(text);
/ /  Get width of each character in this font to calculate size 
/ / o f  entire string
text.width =  XTextWidth(fp_font, text, text Jen); 
x_position =  fwidth/2 - text_width/2;
/ /  Now draw the text on the box, centred 
XDrawImageString(fdisplay, fcurrent.window, fgc, x.position, 







exposures =  True;
/ /  Get rid of the text
XClearArea(fdisplay, fcurrent.window, fpos_x, fpos_y, fwidth, 
fheight, exposures);
/ /  Redraw the box
XFillRectangle(fdisplay, fcurrentjwindow, fgc, fpos_x, fpos_y, 
fwidth, fheight);
}
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
/ /  File : Text.h
/ /
/ /  .
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
/ /  . .
/ /  Description : This file contains the class specification
/ /  for class Text.
/ /
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
#ifndef _DISPLAYBASE_ 
#include ’’DisplayBase .h” 
#endif
class Text : public DisplayBase
{ .
public:
Text(Display ^display, Window parent.win, GC gc, char *fontname, int pos_x, 
int pos_y, char ^string);












/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
/ /  File : Text.C
/ /
/ /  _ _
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
/ /
/ /  Description : This file contains the member functions 
/ /  for class Text.
/ /
/ /
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
#include ’’Text.h”
Text:¡Text(Display ^display, Window parent_win, GC gc, char *fontname, 
int pos_x, int pos_y, char ^string)
{
fdisplay =  display; 
fcurrent.window =  parent.win; 
fgc =  gc; 
fpos_x — pos_x; 
fpos_y =  pos_y;
/ /  Store string in object 
fstring_size =  strlen(string); 
fstring =  new char[fstring_size]; 
strcpy(fstring, string);
i f  ((fpJFont =  XLoadQueryFont(fdisplay, fontname)) = =  NULL)
{




ftext_width =  XTextWidth(fpTont, fstring, fstring^ize);





¡I  Draw the text now







/ /  Get to the centre in the x direction 






Bool exposures =  False;
/ /  Clear the text
XClearArea(fdisplay, fcurrent_window, fpos_x, fpos_y - ftext_height, 
ftext_width, ftext_height, exposures);
/ /  Flush X display 
XFlush(fdisplay);
}
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
/ /  File : Textlnput.h
/ /
/ /  .
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
/ /  .
/ /  Description : This file contains the global declarations
/ /  and class specification for the class 
/ /  Textlnput.
/ /




#include < c ty p e .h >
/ /  Textlnput # defines 
#define MAX-MESSAGES 50 
#define MAX-SENDERS 5 
#def ine MAX-RECEIVERS 5 
#define LINESIZE 100 
#def ine NL 0x0a
#def ine MESSAGESFILE "vo tin g "
#def ine MESSAGETAG "Messages"
# d e fine ASSUMPTIONSTAG "Assumptions"
#def ine M AX-FORM ULAE 10
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/ /  ty p ed ef for idealized messages structure 













void Reinitialize_message_count() { current-message =  0; };
unsigned short NumMessagesQ { return num_messages; };
arrowDir *ReturnArrowsTable();
void Transform_to_idealized();
void Fill_formulae(unsigned short count);
void Insert j3tars_and_extensions();
void Load_assumptions();
unsigned short returnjnum_nodes() const;
char *Return_sender_name();
char * Return-receiver _name();
void Dump_to_file();
char *Return_msg_file();
char * Return _t_msg_file();










char sender -assumptions[M AX_SENDERS] [500];
char receivers[MAX_RECEIVERS][ENTITY-LENGTH];
char msg_files[MAX.MESSAGES][20];
char t_msg_files[M AX-MESS AGES] [20];
};
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
/ /
/ /  File : Textlnput.C
/ /
/ /  , .
/ /  Author : Viswanathan Narain
/ /
/ /  . .
/ /  Description : This file contains the member and other 









/ /  Check for validity of hashed, encrypted or decrypted 
/ /  components
if  (strstr(formula, "h ( " )  || strstr(formula, "encrypt ( " )
|| strstr(formula, "d ecryp t( ") )  






{ . . .
/ /  This assumes that newline terminates a line
w hile (*str)
{
if  (*str = =  NL)












if  (*str — ’% ’)
{
/ /  Forget this line, is a comment 











TextInput::TextInput(char ^filename, char *assumptions_filename)
{ . .
short i j ;
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num_messages =  0; 
current-message =  0;
/ /  Name of protocol specification file 
fmessagesfile =  new char[strlen(filename) +  1]; 
strcpy(fmessagesfile, filename);
/ /  Name of initial assumptions file
fassumptionsfile =  new char[strlen(assumptions_filename) +  1] 
strcpy(fassumptionsfile, assumptionsJfilename);
/ /  Initialize senders
for (i=0 ; i<  MAX-SENDERS; i+ + )
memset(senders[i], 0, ENTITY-LENGTH);
/ /  Initialize receivers
for (i=0 ; i<  MAX-RECEIVERS; i+ + )
memset(receivers[i], 0, EN TITYXEN GTH );
/ /  Initialize idealized structure 
for (j= 0 ; j <  M AX-MESSAGES; j + + )
for (i=0; i <  MAX-FORMULAE; i+ + )
{ . . .  .
memset(idealized[j].formulae[i], 0, 300);
idealized [jj.numJbrmulae =  0;
}
/ /  Initialise assumptions table too., 








/ /  delete messages 
for (i=0 ; i <  num_messages; i+ + )  
delete 0 messages;
/ /  Delete all the temporary files 









Bool Read =  False;
FILE *fptr;
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cerr <  "Cannot open f i l e  <  fmessagesfile <  
" fo r  input \n";
exit (-1);
}
cout <  "messgs f i l e "  <C fmessagesfile <C"\n"; 
cout.flush();








num_messages + =  1;
}
fgets(tempjstr, LINESIZE, fptr); 
strip_newline(temp_str);
}
i f  ( (fp tr  =  fopen (fm essagesfile , " r + " ) )  = =  N U L L  )
cout <  "recv  0 in Load msgs - > "  <C receiversfO] <C "\n "; 
cout.flush();
/ /  Set message counter back to first one 
current_message =  0;
/ /  Close the messages file 
fclose(fptr);







i f  (current.message <  num_messages)
{
theMessageStruct =  new MessageStructflj; 
theMessageStruct—»-sender =
new char[strlen(senders[current_message]) +  1]; 
strcpy(theMessageStruct—»-sender, senders [current-message] ); 
theMessageStruct—»-receiver =
new char[strlen(receivers[current_message]) +  1]; 
strcpy(theMessageStruct—»receiver, receivers[current_message]); 
theMessageStruct—»-message =
new char[strlen(messages[current_message]) +  1]; 
strcpy (theMessageStruct—^message, messages[current_message]);
/ /  Return the current message in this structure
158




/ /  Recursive, return first message again 
current_message =  0;





localarr — new arrowDir[num_messages];
localarr[0] =  right; 
localarrfl] =  left; 






char *message_part, entity_part[10] ; 
static unsigned short m.count =  0;
Bool got_sender; 
short i, j, k;
i f  (num_messages = =  0) 
m_count =  0;
memset(entity_part, 0, 10);
/ /  Point message to after message number at the beginning 
w hile (^message ^  ’) ’) 
messaged-+ ; 
messaged-+ ;
got_sender =  False;
/ /  Get text before " : "  into entity part 
message_part =  strchr(message,
strncpy(entity_part,message, abs(message - message.part));
w hile (!isalnum(*message_part)) 
message_partd-d- ;
j =  0; 
k = 0;
fo r(i= 0 ;i< 1 0 ;i+ + )
{ .
/ /  Sender and receiver
if  (!got_sender kk  (entity_part[i] ^  &;&;
159
{
senders[m_count][j++] =  entity_part[i];
}
if  (got_sender kk  (entity_part[i] ^  kk
(entity.part[i] ^  ’> ’) kk  (!isspace(entity_part[i]))) 
recei vers [m.count] [k++] =  entity_part[i] ; 
i f  (entity_part[i] = =
senders[m_count] [j] =  NULL; 
got_sender =  True;
}
}
receivers[m_count] [k] =  NULL;
cout <  "Send - > "  <  senders[m_count] <  " Recv - > "  <  receivers[m.countl <  
"\ n "; J
cout.flush();
/ /  Store message text into messages 
messages[m_count] =  new char[strlen(message_part) +  1] ; 
strcpy(messages[m_count], message.part) ;
m.count + =  1;
cout <  "recv  0 in Parse msgs - > "  <C receivers[0] <C "\n ";
cout <  "met <C m.count <C "\n";
cout.flush();






unsigned short count; 
short k;
Bool concat;
cout <C "recers 0 before" <C receivers[0] <C "\n "; 
cout.flush(); 
count =  0;
for (count=0; count <  num_messages; count-f+)
Fill Jormulae(count);
/ /  Insert stars and append extensions to all formulae in messages 
Insert jstars_and_extensions();
/ /  Now assemble the message from the formulae 
for (count=0; count <  num_messages; count++)
{
concat =  False;
cout <C "recers " <C receivers[count] <C "\n "; 
cout.flush();
sprintf(dummy.text,"fact('/,hd, to ld ('/,s ", count-fl, 
receiversfcount]);




if  ((k = =  0) kk  (idealized[count].num_formulae >  1))
{
strcat(dummy_text, 
concat =  True;
}
strcat(dummy_text, idealized[count].formulae[k]);
i f  (concat)
st r cat (dummy .text,
strcat(dummy_text, " ) ,  r e a so n ([] , 'S te p ’ ) ) . " ) ;






char *tempString, *str; 
char key [15]; 
short i,k,j;
tempString =  messagesfcount];
i =  k =  j =  0;
while (^tempString)
{
/ /  Does formula begin with "en c"
if  (((^tempString = =  ’e’) kk  (*(tempString +  1) = =  ’n’) 
kk  (*(tempString +  2) = =  ’c’)))
{
str =  tempString +  4; 
while (*str ^  ’) ’)
key [jH—h] =  *str++; 
strH—h;
key [j] -  NULL;
tempString =  str++ ;
while (^tempString ^  ’{ ’) 
tempString++;
strcpy(idealized[count].formulaefi], "encrypt( ") ;
k + =  8;
tempString++;
while (^tempString ^ ’} ’)
idealized[count].formulae[i][k++] =  *tempString++ 
idealized[count].formulae[i][k] =  NULL; 
idealized[count].num_formulae++;
strcat(idealized[count].formulae[i], " ,  ") ; 
strcat(idealized[count] .formulae[i], key); 
strcat(idealized[count].formulae[i], " ) ) " ) ;
j =  0;
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/ /  Does it begin with "d e c"
if ((*tempString = =  ’d’) kk  (*(tempString -f 1) = =  V )  
kk  (*(tempString -f 2) = =  ’c’))
{
str =  tempString +  4; 
while (*str /  ’) ’)
keyp++] =  *str++ ; 
strH—|-;
key[j] =  NULL;
tempString =  str++ ;
while (^tempString /  ’{ ’) 
tempString++;
strcpy(idealized[count].formulaep], "decrypt( ") ;
k + =  8;
tempString++;
while (^tempString ^ ’ } ’)
idealized [count].formulae [i][k++] =  *tempString++; 
idealized[count].formulae[i][k] =  NULL; 
idealized[count].num_formulae++;
strcat(idealized[count].formulae[i], " ,  "); 
strcat(idealized[count] .formulae[i], key); 
strcat(idealized[count].formulae[i], " ) ) " ) ;
k =  0; 
i+ + ;
} .
/ /  Does it begin with "pub"
if ((^tempString = =  ’p’) kk  (^(tempString + 1) = =  V )  
kk  (^(tempString +  2) = =  ’b’))
{ .
str =  tempString +  4;
while (*str ^  ’) ’)
key[j-l—h] =  *str++; 
str++ ;
key[j] =  NULL;
tempString =  str++;
while (^tempString ±  ’ { ’) 
tempString-f+;
strcpy(idealized[count] .formulaep], " encrypt ( " ) ;
k + =  8;
tempString++;
while (^tempString /  ’ } ’)
idealized [count] .formulaep] [k++] =  *tempString++; 
idealized [count],formulaep] [k] =  NULL; 
idealizedjcount] .num _formulae++;
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strcat(idealized[count].formulae[i], " ,  ") ; 
strcat(idealized[count] .formulaefi], key); 
strcat(idealized[count].formulae[i], " ) ) " ) ;  
k =  0; 
i+ + ;
}
/ /  Does it start with "p r i "
if ((*tempString = =  ’p’) kk  (*(tempString +  1) = =  V )  
kk  (*(tempString +  2) = =  ’i’))
{
str =  tempString +  4; 
while (*str ^  ’) ’)
key[j++] =  *str++; 
strd—|-;
key [j] =  NULL;
tempString =  str++;
while (^tempString /  ’{ ’) 
tempString++;
strcpy(idealized[count].formulaefi], "decrypt ( " ) ;
k + =  8;
tempString+d-;
while (^tempString ^  ’} ’)
idealized[count].formulae[i][k++] =  *tempString++; 
idealized[count].formulae[i][k] =  NULL; 
idealized[count].num_formulae++;
strcat(idealized[count].formulae[i], " ,  ") ; 
strcat(idealized[count].formulae[i], key); 
strcat(idealized[count].formulae[i], " ) ) " ) ;  




/ /  Does it start with "h ( " , for hashed
if ((^tempString = =  ’h’) kk  (^(tempString -f 1) = =  ’{ ’))
{ .
tempString - f=  2;
str cat (idealized [count] .formulaefi], "h ( ");
k + =  2;
while (^tempString /  ’} ’)
idealized[count].formulae[i][k++] =  *tempString++; 
idealized[count].formulae[i][k++] =  ’) ’ ; 
idealized[count].formulae[i][k] =  NULL; 
idealizedfcount] .num_formulae++;
i+ + ;  
k =  0;
}
else
/ /  Next component ?
if ((^tempString ^ ’ , ’) kk (!isspace(*tempString)) kk 
isalnum(*tempString))
{
while ((^tempString ^ ’ , ’) kk (!isspace(*tempString))
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(*tempString ^  NULL))
idealized[count].formulae[i][k++] =  *tempString++;
idealized[count].formulae[i][k] =  NULL; 
idealized [count] ,num_formulae++;
i+ + ;  
k =  0;
}







short ij,k ,a , sender index; 
char tempstr[550];
Bool Sent;
for (i—0; i <  num_messages; i+ + )
for(a=0; a <  idealized[i].num_formulae; a + + )
{
/ /  Valid component for insertion of stars ? 
if (!ValidFormula(idealized[i].formulae[a])) 
continue;
Sent =  False;
for (j=0; j <  i; j+ + )
if  (!strcmp(senders[j], receivers[i]))
for (k=0; k <  idealized[j].num_formulae; k + + )  
if (!strcmp(idealized[j],formulae[k], 
idealized[i].formulae[a]))
Sent =  True;
if  (¡Sent)
{
/ / I f  not sent before 
for (k=0; k <  num_messages; k + + )  
if (!strcmp(senders[k], senders[i]))
{ .




/ /  Build translated formula 
strcpy(tempstr, "e x t (s ta r ( ") ;  
strcat(tempstr, idealizedfi].formulae[a]); 
strcat(tempstr, " ) " ) ;
if  (sender_assumptions[senderindex] ^  " " )
{
strcat(tempstr, " ,  ") ;
strcat(tempstr, sender_assumptions[senderindex]) 
strcat(tempstr, " ) " ) ;
}
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char *strl, *str2, *str3;
char belief [500], sender [ENTITY _LEN GTH];
unsigned short aJndex, no_beliefs[MAX_SENDERS], i, j;
/ /  Open initial assumptions file 
fp =  fopen(fassumptionsfile, " r + " ) ;
if  (fp = =  NULL)
{
cerr -C "Could not open f i l e  " <C fassumptionsfile <C "\n" 
exit(l);
}
/ /  Initialise no.beliefs to all 0.. 
for (i=0; i <  MAX-SENDERS; i+ + )  
no_beliefs[i] =  0;





if  ((stri =  strstr(string, POSSESSES)) ||
(stri =  strstr(string, CONVEYED)) || 
(stri =  strstr(string, BELIEVES)))
{
if ((str2 =  strstr(strl, REASON)) = =  NULL) 
str2 =  strstr(strl, REASON.SP);
/ /  Get the belief from input string 
strncpy(belief, stri, abs(str2-strl)); 
str3 =  strstr(belief, " ( " ) ;  
str3H—h;
i =  0;
while (*str3 ^  ’ , ’)
sender[i++] =  *str3++; 
sender[i] =  NULL;
/ /  Get index of sender
for (j=0; j <  num_messages; j + + )
if (!strcasecmp(senders[j], sender))
{ .




if  (no_beliefs[a_index] >  0)
strcat(sender_assumptions[aJndex], " ,  ") ;
strcat(sender _assumptions[a_index], belief); 








unsigned short i, j;
unsigned short numjsenders, num_receivers;
/ /  Number of nodes cannot be more than this 
numjsenders =  num_receivers =  num_messages;
for (i=0; i <  num_messages; i+ + )
for ( j= ( i+ l) ; j <  num_messages; j+ + )
{ ,
if (!strcmp(senders[i], senders[j])) 
num_senders -=  1; 
if (!strcmp(receivers[i], receivers[j])) 
num_receivers -=  1;
}
/ /  return maximum of senders and receivers





static unsigned short count =  0; 
short i;
Bool tag;
tag =  False;
while (!tag kk  (count <  num_messages))
{
tag =  True;
for (i=0; i <  count; i+ + )
if (!strcmp(senders[i], senders[count]))
{














static unsigned short count =  0; 
short i;
Bool tag;
tag =  False;
w hile (!tag &;&; (count <  num_messages))
{
tag =  True;
for (i=0 ; i <  count; i+ + )
if  (!strcmp(receivers[i], receivers[count])) 














char ano_str[20], tstr[30], tempstr[30]; 
char stored.[30], store_2[30];
for (k=0; k <  num_messages; k + + )
/ /  Build temporary message files(2) for XSB commands and





/ /  File containing message string 
fp =  fopen(tempstr,"w+");
for (j=0 ; j <  k; j+ + )
fprintf(fp, "*/.s \n", idealized[j].text);
fclose(fp);
/ /  File for GNY input in XSB Prolog
fp =  fopen(tstr,"w+");
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fprintf(fp, "'/,s \n", " [b a s ic s , con tro l, gny_mod]."); 
sprintf(ano_str,"analyze(*/,s). ",tempstr); 
fprintf(fp, "'/,s \n", ano_str); 
fprintf(fp, M'/,s \n", " l i s t i n g . " ) ;
fclose(fp);
/ /  Store both the file names for use later 
strcpy(msg_files[k], tempstr); 






if (current-message <  num_messages)
{
store =  current-message; 
increment_ctr();









i f  (current-message <  num_messages)








B .l The Voting Protocol
1. Q - * Pi :N,
2. P i - + Q : P iiNi,Vi, H { N „ < S i >,Vi)
3. Q - * P, : R,H(Nh < S{ > ,R)
B .l .l  Protocol Representation
% Concrete Description of Voting protocol
1) q -> pi : nq
2) pi -> q : pi, ni, vi, h{[nq, si, vi]}
3) q -> pi : r, h{[ni, si, r]}
% Initial Assumptions for Voting Protocol
fact(4, possesses(pi, si), reason([], 'Assumption')).
fact(5, possesses(pi, ni), reason([], 'Assumption')).
fact(6, believes(pi, secret(q, si, pi)), reason([], 'Assumption'))
fact(8, possesses(q, si), reason([], 'Assumption')).
fact(9, possesses(q, nq), reason([], 'Assumption')).
fact(10, believes(q, secret(q, si, pi)), reason([], 'Assumption'))




The following pages show the following states of execution of the Protocol 
Analyzer with the Voting protocol:
1. Main window showing protocol schematic diagram, in the initial wait 
state
2. Main window after step 1 of the protocol, in the Full-Run mode
3. Main window after step 2 of the protocol, in the Full-Run mode
4. Main window after step 3 of the protocol, in the Full-Run mode
5. Belief subwindow showing beliefs of q, in the initial wait state
6. Belief subwindow showing beliefs of pz, in the initial wait state
7. Belief subwindow showing beliefs of pi after step 1 of the protocol in 
Single-Step mode
8. Belief sub window showing beliefs of q after step 1 of the protocol in 
Single-Step mode
9. Belief subwindow showing beliefs of pi after step 2 of the protocol in 
Single-Step mode
10. Belief subwindow showing beliefs of q after step 2 of the protocol in 
Single-Step mode
11. Belief subwindow showing beliefs of pi after step 3 of the protocol in 
Single-Step mode
12. Belief subwindow showing beliefs of q after step 3 of the protocol in 
Single-Step mode
13. Proof of a derived statement in the Single-Step mode
14. Window showing initial assumptions for re-editing
15. Belief subwindow showing revised beliefs of pi, after re-editing initial 
assumptions, in Single-Step mode
16. Belief subwindow showing revised beliefs of g, after re-editing initial as­
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assump_2.'' 12 Lines. 443 characters
N ara in
% Assumptions
fact(4, possesses(pi, si), reason([], 'Assumption')).
fact(5, possesses(pi, ni), reason([], 'Assumption')),
fact(6, believes(pi, secret(q, si, pi)), reason([], 'Assumption'))
fact(7, possesses<q, si), reason(□, 'Assumption')),
fact(8, possesses(q, nq), reason(C], 'Assumption')).
fact(9, beLievesXq, secret(q, si, pi)), reason(Cl, 'Assumption')).
fact(10, believes(q, fresh(nq)), reason(□, 'Assumption')).
flag(count, 10).

vl n t H M M t t i  & f p $  m  H i
told(pi,nq),reasonQ],Step) 1 
possesses(pi,si^tieasonQ],Assum ption) i
posse sse s(p iIni),reasonQ],Assumption) 1
believes(pi,secret(q, si, pi)ireasonQ], Assum ption) ( 
poss6sses(pi,nqXreasonQ1],P1) |
B .2 Yahalom Protocol
1 . A - -> B ■ A ,N a
2 . B - -> S : B , { A , N a,Nb} Kia
3. S - + A : {B,I<ai,Na,Nb} ‘Kat, { A , K ab} Kbt
4. A - ■* B '■ { A , K ab} K^ , { N b} K^
B .2.1 Protocol Representation
#/. Concrete description of Yahalom protocol
1) a -> b : a, na
2) b -> s : b, enc(shared(kbs)){[a, na, nb]}
3) s -> a : enc(shared(kas)){[b, shared(kab), na, nb]}, 
enc(shared(kbs)){[a, shared(kab)]}
4) a -> b : enc(shared(kbs)){[a, shared(kab)]}, enc(shared(kab)){nb} 
% Initial Assumptions for Yahalom Protocol
fact(5, possesses(a, shared(kas)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(6, believes(a, secret(a, kas, s)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(7, possesses(a, na), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(8, believes(a, fresh(na)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(9, believes(a, recognizes(b)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(10, believes(a, honest(s)), reason([], 'Assumption')), 
fact(11, believes(a, controls(s, secret(a, kab, b))), reason([],
'Assumption')).
fact(12, possesses(b, shared(kbs)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(13, believes(b, secret(b, kbs, s)), reason([], 'Assumption')), 
fact(14, possesses(b, nb), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(15, believes(b, fresh(nb)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(16, believes(b, recognizes(nb)), reason([], 'Assumption')), 
fact(17, believes(b, recognizes(a)), reason([], 'Assumption')), 
fact(18, believes(b, honest(s)), reason([], 'Assumption')), 
fact(19, believes(b, honest(a)), reason([], 'Assumption')), 
fact(20, believes(b, controls(s, secret(a, kab, b))), reason([],
'Assumption')).
fact(21, believes(b, controls(a, believes(s, secret(a, kab, b)))), 
reason( [], 'Assumption')).
fact(22, believes(b, secret(a, nb, b)), reason([], 'Assumption')).
fact(23, possesses(s, shared(kas)), reason([], 'Assumption')), 
fact(24, believes(s, secret(a, kas, s)), reason([], 'Assumption')), 
fact(25, possesses(s, shared(kbs)), reason([], 'Assumption')), 
fact(26, believes(s, secret(b, kbs, s)), reason([], 'Assumption')).
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fact(27, possesses(s, shared(kab)), reason([], ;Assumpti onJ)) . 
fact(28, believes(s, secret(a, kab, b)), reason([], 'Assumpt ion;))•
flag(count, 28).
B.2.2 Output Screens
The following pages show the following stages in the execution of the Protocol 
Analyzer with the Yahalom protocol:
1. Main window showing the protocol schematic diagram, in the initial wait 
state
2. Main window after step 1 of the protocol, in the Full-Run mode
3. Main window after step 2 of the protocol, in the Full-Run mode
4. Main window after step 3 of the protocol, in the Full-Run mode
5. Main window after step 4 of the protocol, in the Full-Run mode
6. Belief subwindow showing the beliefs of a, in the initial wait state
7. Belief subwindow showing the beliefs of 6, in the initial wait state
8. Belief subwindow showing the beliefs of s, in the initial wait state
9. Belief subwindow showing the beliefs of a after step 1 of the protocol, in 
the Single-Step mode
10. Belief sub window showing the beliefs of b after step 1 of the protocol, in 
the Single-Step mode
11. Belief subwindow showing the beliefs of s after step 1 of the protocol, in 
the Single-Step mode
12. Belief subwindow showing the beliefs of a after step 2 of the protocol, in 
the Single-Step mode
13. Belief subwindow showing the beliefs of b after step 2 of the protocol, in 
the Single-Step mode
14. Belief subwindow showing the beliefs of s after step 2 of the protocol, in 
the Single-Step mode
15. Belief subwindow showing the beliefs of a after step 3 of the protocol, in 
the Single-Step mode
16. Belief subwindow showing the beliefs of b after step 3 of the protocol, in 
the Single-Step mode
17. Belief subwindow showing the beliefs of s after step 3 of the protocol, in 
the Single-Step mode
188
18. Belief subwindow showing the beliefs of a after step 4 of the protocol, in 
the Single-Step mode
19. Belief subwindow showing the beliefs of b after step 4 of the protocol, in 
the Single-Step mode
20. Belief subwindow showing the beliefs of s after step 4 of the protocol, in 
the Single-Step mode
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4. believes(b,recognizesQa,na])) {3,2, R11}
B.3 Output Screens
The following pages show the output screens for the beliefs subwindows ob­
tained from the Protocol Analyzer for experiments with the Voting and Otway- 
Rees protocols.
Protocol Analyzer with the Voting protocol:
1. Beliefs subwindow showing q’s beliefs after the run of the protocol with 
the original set of initial assumptions
2. Beliefs subwindow showing q1 s beliefs after the run of the protocol with 
the initial assumptions, modified as given in Chapter 6, subsection 6.2.1
Protocol Analyzer with the Otway-Rees protocol:
1. Main window showing the protocol schematic diagram of Otway-Rees 
protocol
2. Beliefs subwindow showing a’s beliefs after the run of the protocol with 
the original set of initial assumptions
3. Beliefs subwindow showing a’s beliefs after the run of the protocol with 








possesses(q,si),reason([], Assum ption) | 
posses3es(q,nq),reasonQ],Assum ption) 1 
believes(q,secrct(q,si,pi)^reasonQ],Assum ption) I  








possesses(q,pi)reasonQ 11],P1) a 
possesses(q,m )reasonQ12j,P1) | 





c m  fl» o  
=  «  
«  C A  <  Cl» 
f l »  C A  
C A  C A
S '  S
o t P
Í A  3 "  
CA Q  fl» ™T 
C A  o  
C A  r 1 
f l »  C A  
C A  J
o_
CL
3  ■*“ J U
U■Ml
<




c r c r c r u c r  c t t j  "o  "o  "o  "o  t j
f l »  C D  C D  C D  C D  C D  O  O  O  O  O  O
c a  c a  c a  c a  c a
C D C D C D C D C D C D c A C A C A C A C A C A  
< < < < < < C D C D C D C D C D C D  
C D C D C D C D C D C D C A C A C A C A C A C A  
C A C A C A C A C A C A C A C A C A C A C A C A
■■______________ ■» C D  C D  C D  C D  C D  C D
S 2 J 2 J 2 J 2  C A  C A  C A  C A  C A  C A
n n n n n  2  S ' S ' S ' S ' S ' SO O O O O O V* M -- -*
3  3  3  3  3  3  <  3  “C< < < < < <  S “
C D  C D  C D  C D  C D  f t  3
1< 1< 1< < < 1< < <  Q  Ç A  C D  C D  C D  = î .
» . » . . . . H ' i - g g g j
-s;: s, si %%%%%%$H U  'S
g g £ a . 5  * « ü i a
O O O O  
Q . Q . CL GL
S ' S ' S ' S '■J 'J <J M
a çp <
' 5  3  3
Â S  sO O
C A  . .  .
" •  3  I O  M  
<  -Q L 1
—  »  “ * —iw  -■ ro m
’= « • *  g  ¡ î â f é = “ “ t l_ ____< o  o  w jQ “  3  _
3 - é á á  °  a . S  S  ^
§ S ä S ä « i i § S
«  U h  t u  —  ■ t i r - * ,  o  __k. c d
= iw  »  = 3 lï s  - j  »  Q  o  w  C i o  Q “  CA
^  2  C A  C D
=  ¿  C A  ^  y  C Acd
c a  t o w T 3 .
C A  ' l l .
C D  b  3
C A  -
lu
C O






C A  
C A  
f l »  
C A
w —  S
ï ’ g ü
Sio
3
T 3  O 
C A  
C A  
C D  
C A  
C A  











5 »  ° " S  a . ^« A 3  O
^  «  J“ 3_ £ sr g =f j"
U W U U U U U U M ^
.  T ? >  <d  O O O O  c d  O  ®  r> Ç 5 J3  J“  »  í * J° J“  i0 »  ^  M O TT *, _ „ „ i íP s  g 'îg ’P ï^a-Iâ
3- O ® “ü  »  3  —̂--3- 3  tí to/Z? 3  ^ ¿ Z  5  Ä  w JS. 3 U ¡K £S J2. O r-fc 3 JJf JT,^-1S ? — ■ S  O) a  u u  ^  3 « Ä S  'c?,3 g Ä S Ä  g S J" «  "
ET !? 1 Î  5  S  —13  o  «  Ö V - 1 Î5 to
oO
H
S-S-'S.«  S -
* i ! w
Ì 3 J 5 5  zr 
J1* v -* lL ô  «* 5
>  c r â ^ Â  c .  
£  2.  s  S
ro 3  
S
o  T
H 3  3  _ S g g ¡U
> 3 . 0  S Ç ï a ' s F ^ «
t -g  i * o S  1 S g S £ 2.J“ 3> E to c  g o£| * «
C A
« U
i i > > 2
C A C AC A
S S  s  g5  5 - 0  °  w J  =  o
ï #  l i t i sB a-S»- “  «
C  Z O  C A3  o  v - ' c  S ï - i = ,v ' i . ^ ç a
3 3 | > § Ï Ï 3 ?
s i l s
0  5  9  =
3 § 5 3







S= 5 ' 9 l/i B ’O3 a s  gCD «! 2
C D


















C A  <  V -
II«ju F  »
c d  o  w :
a . § ^' S ' â o
a t Q  CA
Â « s
™ «* «
o  «  S  
<3





2 C g - g -x i  cr  c  cr  c m  c x j  =^=a g - 
u  5 . 2 . 0  n n n n o n o * !  F  EL' * -------— ---------------------- =  ca <  ? r  Q.
C D  C A  C D  s
»  F*
C A  Q .  Q .
g ^ Ä  J" J"C A  
C A  







3  CA CU 
E L  CD Q> CA 
CA CA 5  O  


















C A »  S  0 s «
J"
3
S I g  a x
0 ^ 3  > Ç D _ J »
"B. 3-=3 3Q Ä  C“2S feÿ <  Eî
ZJ JU CD 5
£ £
~  ® £ S 3 |
£  S - o  « w







“ S f i t t ifi* 3 N m
J D  J D  j f U  J l >  C Â
¡ S ’ t g Ç3- S S. o gi. a-IF = V-.
ü ' « ' Ä  H Ï f
'— Î S - h ' C Dç ' a Â of-1! ™ 3  jy 3  3
! § s g e a *
«#ië¥  ? I
l i a s » gâ n — p t t 3
3 3 | ' > 3 Ï ? 3 ? '  s i ^ s 3 »  g s  gi  »  § i  | i g  s¡  
e - 3 !  - t ¥ . s  =L̂_ — ■ n  O _ ü
¡ l e e s
■ S - S g  I
O3 V-' c
ü
■ÿmtim«
m
>
C A
C AC
o3
¿ttOôôOôôôCOÔôôôôôOôOOOôOôôôOôOÔOOOOÔôOOÔCCOôôôOOOôOOOOôôcîxixixîcieWcieîci&oâxÂe*^

